INQUIRY

MAGAZINE

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The Psychiatrist as a Partner in Crime

Taking Children Away from Their Parents

Donald Davie, George Woodcock, Peter Schrag, Ronald Radosh, Stephen Harvey

JIMMY CARTER and the NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

By MARCUS G. RASKIN



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- **The Abuse of the Social Security Number:** The SSN is becoming an albatross around our necks, imprisoning all of us in our recorded pasts without any chance for a "fresh start."
- **The Private Security Industry:** Private police spy on customers in department store fitting rooms and bathrooms, watching for shoplifters. Thirty-one percent of them believe it is a crime if a customer calls them a pig.
- **Controlling Our Spies:** Radical surgery is needed to make the intelligence community work for democracy, not against it.
- **Psychological Testing of Students:** Fifth graders are being asked: If you were paralyzed in an auto accident, how much time would you spend blaming the driver, thinking about suicide, and trying to recuperate? Their answers are supposed to show if they possess "normal" beliefs and attitudes.
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AFTER A WAR IS LOST, those responsible for losing it usually don't remain in power. How, then, has it happened that so many of this administration's top officials are old Kennedy and Johnson hands? In this issue, Marcus G. Raskin provides the answer: They found a "relatively obscure figure" who "could restore allegiance to the old system" and "knew how to co-opt the liberal forces." To discover this figure's identity—and the office to which he was elected—you will have to read Raskin's article.

The national security state, Carter-style

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RES PUBLICA

None of them wants to vote, either

■ A South African provincial official said Friday that Pretoria's planned $53 million opera house will be for whites only because blacks don't appreciate opera music. "They don't believe in the same sort of entertainment as we do," Sybrand Van Niekerk, administrator of the Transvaal province, said in announcing the ban on blacks at the new opera house.

—*Los Angeles Times, Feb. 11, 1978*

Actually, his tailor deserved a better President

■ Although it goes against the American grain to say so, Nixon had a serious idea when he put White House guards in those unfortunate uniforms. His idea, shared by de Gaulle, was that *especially* in a democracy, the authority of government, and particularly of the Executive, depends on an element of grandeur. His idea deserved a better tailor.

—GEORGE F. WILL, *Newsweek, Mar. 6, 1978*

And why wouldn't they be grateful?

■ In one of the harshest applications of its war policy yet disclosed, the Government of Rhodesia has warned blacks living in a tribal area on the country's eastern border that adult curfew violators will be shot and that their children will be shot if they venture out of their villages, even in daylight. . . .

One Government supporter, Patrick Shields, told the black members [of the Assembly] they should be grateful that they lived in a "civilized country," and not in one of the black-ruled nations to the north, where no criticism of government policy was permitted.

—*New York Times, Feb. 23, 1978*

Watch what we do, not what we say

■ President Carter personally authorized, at the request of the attorney general, the television surveillance of the American involved [in the Vietnam spy case], USIA official Ronald Humphrey. . . .

The President's involvement is a matter of some embarrassment, because he is on the record as favoring legislation that would require a judicial warrant for wiretapping, even in "national security" cases. At the same time, the White House says that his direct approval for the Humphrey surveillance was required under the new executive intelligence order.

—MARY MCGRORY, *Washington Star, Feb. 13, 1978*

■ Last August, three citizens whose letters had been opened [by the CIA] won a suit against the Government for invasion of their privacy. Federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein of Brooklyn awarded the three victims $1,000 each in damages. . . .

The Department of Justice—Jimmy Carter's Department of Justice—is now appealing that decision. A department brief says it "will not argue that the actions of the CIA in this case were legal or constitutional." But Federal law, it argues, gives the victims no remedy against the Government. And in any event, $1,000 in damages was "excessive."

—ANTHONY LEWIS, *New York Times, Feb. 27, 1978*

Funny you should mention that

■ Frankly, our faith in the rationality of the system has declined somewhat in the first year.

—JODY POWELL, *quoted in the New York Times, Feb. 21, 1978*

He was busy not being familiar with the Marston case

■ Government attorneys twice warned a federal judge last month that the FBI and Justice Department might disobey any Supreme Court order to disclose the identities of FBI informants, it was disclosed Thursday. . . .

When asked about the revelations, Attorney General Griffin B. Bell attempted to disassociate himself from the federal attorneys' statements. Bell said he was not familiar with the facts of the case—a multimillion-dollar damage suit against the FBI by the Socialist Workers Party. . . .

[Said Bell], "The government interest in protecting the identity of informants is a very important interest. However, any proposal to deviate from the policy of obeying court orders should have my personal attention."

—*Los Angeles Times, Mar. 3, 1978*

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"Settling" the coal strike

Carter prolongs the strife

ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 6, after miners had refused to knuckle under to his settlement of the coal strike, President Carter invoked the compulsory back-to-work provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. Carter's use of Taft-Hartley was yet another in a series of actions by which the administration has injected itself into this troubling labor dispute. As always, such White House involvement has retarded negotiation of a mutually acceptable agreement. Each step taken by the administration has been followed by speculation by both sides about what further steps would be forthcoming and whose advantage would be served by the next administration move.

On February 24, President Carter announced to the nation a "voluntary settlement" of the then 81-day-old nationwide coal strike. "It was because we believed in the free process of collective bargaining," he boasted, "that I have been so determined to give that process every chance to work. It has worked."

How devoted the President was to the free process of collective bargaining may be gauged by the fact that the bargaining council of the mine union was not even consulted in the final negotiations and had to watch the President on television to learn about the agreement.

Even more important in weighing the President's commitment to free collective bargaining is the process by which the agreement was finally reached. After months of deadlock between union and industry, the White House announced at three o'clock in the afternoon of February 24 that if a settlement was not concluded by nine that night, the President would go on television to proclaim "drastic steps" of government intervention and compulsion in the dispute. It was indicated that Carter would invoke the Taft-Hartley Act, activating a provision forcing the miners back to work for an 80-day period. This would be followed by a temporary three-month seizure of the mines by the federal government. The point of the seizure would have been to impose the government's desired terms of settlement. After that, it would have been politically impossible for the mine operators to rescind these "temporary" terms.

Four hours after this bludgeon was wielded by the President, the mine operators resigned themselves to their fate, and agreed to the terms demanded by the union leadership and the government. "We weren't negotiating with the UMW any longer," one coal industry official pointed out. "We were negotiating with the government." Another coal industry official commented: "Frankly, we were mugged" by the Carter administration.

Carter wielded several weapons in his concerted campaign to bludgeon the coal industry into submission. First was a threat to dissolve the industry-wide bargaining structure, causing the mine operators to bargain by region or even by single mine—a destabilizing action which coal industry officials warned would "bring chaos and ruin to us all." Second, the Carter administration orchestrated a large number of pressure phone calls to leading coal executives from state governors as well as corporate heads in other industries. Third, the administration engineered a number of what the industry termed "threats" from various state regulatory officials, warning silkily that companies failing to sign the agreement might experience sudden difficulties and delays in obtaining important government permits. Fourth, Carter summoned to the White House the heads of five major coal companies for a last-minute pressure-cooker meeting with him, Mondale, and Labor Secretary Ray Marshall.

That "freedom" means compulsion in President Carter's Orwellian lexicon is seen by the words he used just after hailing the mine settlement—which he described as better than the "drastic steps that I was prepared to take this evening if the negotiating process had failed." He then proceeded to show that the miners as well as the operators were being whipped into shape by government coercion. Urging the mine workers to ratify the agreement signed by their leaders, Carter warned that if it "is not approved without delay, time will have run out for all of us and I will have to take the drastic and unsatisfactory legal action which I would have announced tonight."

But union members proved to be fully as unhappy as the coal operators about the "voluntary" pact imposed upon both groups by the Carter administration. Now that the miners have rejected the pact, the administration must finally employ its much brandished weapons. A supine Congress would undoubtedly rush through a law authorizing federal seizure of the mines. But the miners can be expected to defy the Taft-Hartley Act, for they have done so with impunity three times in the past. And well they might, for after all, what else is forced labor but slavery, even if it lasts for only 80 days? If the miners defy the government for the fourth time, what then? Will the President send troops into the coal miners' homes and drag them back to work? The Pentagon has a plan, Operation Gardenplot, ready for such a contingency. Or will Carter, as the revered Harry Truman threatened to do with railroad strikers in 1946, draft the miners into the army and put them back to work under military discipline?

Free bargaining between labor and management is the only way to avoid erosion of corporate independence, imposition of forced work, or military occupation of the coal fields. Similarly, free bargaining is the only way to avoid prolonged labor disputes, such as this one, in which each party hopes to benefit by anticipating the next move of the political authorities. The Carter administration's hypocrisy in this strike, and the tendency of its efforts to prolong the strife, underline the importance of genuine free bargaining.

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A failure of self-restraint

Tilting toward Somalia

WHEN THE LOCAL AMHARA RULERS who created Ethiopia and the European colonial powers carved up the Horn of Africa in the course of conquest, the Somali-speaking peoples were divided up among areas in what are now Somalia and portions of Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. Since April 1977, the ethnic Somalis, with support since July 1977 from Somalia's armed forces, have stepped up their fight for independence from Ethiopia.

This Somali revolt has been complicated by aid to Ethiopia from Libya, Israel, Cuba, North and South Korea, East and West Germany, and the Soviet Union. Lesser amounts of aid to the Somalis have come from Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

The United States has on several occasions condemned the support that Somalia's troops have given to their rebel Somali brethren in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Like present and past rulers of Ethiopia, the United States seems to want the colonial boundary treaty of 1897 between Ethiopia and Italy to be the last word on the Somali-Ethiopian border.

More importantly, the American public has been told frequently—now almost daily—that global peace is threatened by growing Cuban and Russian aid to Ethiopia. Yet, in the recent past, the American presence in Ethiopia—in combined numbers of civilian advisers and uniformed troops—has been, at times, as large or larger than the current Russian and Cuban presence.

In a February 24 White House briefing for reporters, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski stressed that the United States is trying—as part of its coordination of policy with African countries like Nigeria—to accomplish two missions with its pronouncements on the Horn of Africa. It is seeking to decrease Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia, while backing those rulers of African states who wish to preserve the colonial boundaries.

In an effort to preserve some American influence in Ethiopia, which broke ties with the United States in April 1977, Washington encouraged Israel to provide extensive aid to the Ethiopian government. On February 17 Carter sent Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security David L. Aaron as his personal envoy to Addis Ababa. The United States has begun work on choosing a person to fill the post, vacant since May 1976, of American ambassador to Ethiopia. Congress has also approved $10 million of relief aid to Ethiopia, and the Carter administration also cleared delivery of $700,000 worth of delayed nonlethal weaponry to Ethiopia.

Nonetheless, this may be the extent of American aid to Ethiopia. Brzezinski's approach of tilting toward the Somalis and linking the war to détente appears to have been adopted. Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski have each made a Rubicon of the imaginary line in the desert that constitutes the colonial boundary between Ethiopia and Somalia. The United States is pledged to back Somalia—at least with arms shipments—if the fighting spills over the border into Somalia. (Iran announced in December that it would not "stand idly by" if Ethiopia crossed the border. Sadat has said that he would not exclude the possibility that Egypt would send troops to aid Somalia in the face of an invasion.) Carter gave such a border crossing global dimensions when he said that the United States would "consider it a very serious breach of peace, endangering even worldwide peace."

Since March, Carter and Brzezinski have been proclaiming a linkage between SALT and the Horn of Africa—a linkage which they claimed had spontaneously arisen in the minds of the American people. (As early as February, Vance implied that events in the Horn were indirectly linked to Soviet-American talks on force levels in the Indian Ocean.) Despite the administration's protestations, this is a revival of an old, and undesirable, Kissinger tactic.

The *Wall Street Journal* suggests editorially that events in the Horn demonstrate that "we had better keep our powder dry," develop a capacity to project American power in the region, and put more money into the military budget.

We suggest that events demonstrate that the Carter administration does not have the self-restraint to stay out of the Horn, is getting the United States more deeply involved every day, and is looking nervously for the most opportune time at which to exert American power and influence.

INQUIRY

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THOMAS SZASZ

The psychiatrist as accomplice

SINCE WORLD WAR II PSYCHIatry has had an exceedingly good press, especially in the United States. A combination of physician and priest, the psychiatrist, it seemed, could do no wrong. He dealt with the most "difficult" patients and even if his methods were sometimes "heroic," his aim was always "therapeutic."

In the last few years, especially when looking at Russian psychiatry, the press has discarded its rose-colored glasses. The fact that, in the United States, psychiatrists *not only* do the same things their colleagues in Russia do, but, in addition, systematically act to exonerate individuals who have killed other, innocent individuals, seems so far to have escaped the attention of civil libertarians and journalists.

There are countless ways in which psychiatry may be "abused." With respect to incarceration, psychiatry may be abused in two ways: by inculpating the innocent and by exculpating the guilty. For example, when a "mentally healthy" dissident is diagnosed as schizophrenic and committed to a mental hospital in Russia, we have an instance of the psychiatric inculpation of an innocent person as permanently insane. Such acts are now condemned by Western intellectuals and journalists as the psychiatric abuses of a totalitarian government. When, on the other hand, a so-called mad killer is diagnosed as suffering from some form of mental illness and is acquitted by reason of insanity in America, we have an instance of the psychiatric exculpation of a person as temporarily insane. Such acts are now praised by Western intellectuals and journalists as the scientific applications of humane psychiatry. In my opinion these two sets of acts are symmetrical: In the one, the psychiatrist acts as an accessory to what—morally speaking—is a crime by the state; in the other, he acts as an accessory to what—morally speaking—is a crime by an individual. Moreover, since killing an innocent person is a graver offense than imprisoning him, the American psychiatrist who helps to acquit a killer as not guilty by reason of insanity should be regarded as having committed a graver "psychiatric abuse" than his Russian colleague who helps to imprison an innocent person as a schizophrenic.

The death of Randolph Evans and the subsequent trial of his killer illustrate a typically American psychiatric abuse. Its professional acceptance and popular approval illustrate that Americans love their own "abuses" of psychiatry (which, of course, they regard as its "proper uses") at least as much as the Russians love theirs.

Randolph Evans was a black youth who lived in Brooklyn. On Thanksgiving Day in 1976, when he was 15 years old, he was shot and killed by a white policeman named Robert H. Torsney. Officer Torsney was charged with murder while on duty. He pleaded insanity. On December 1, 1977, an all-white jury acquitted Torsney as not guilty by reason of insanity. To my knowledge, no reporter, no politician, no civil libertarian, domestic or foreign, has denounced the Torsney verdict as another instance of the American abuse of psychiatry.

Courtroom psychiatrists who seek to exonerate killers are, morally speaking, accomplices to the taking of an innocent life.

WHY WAS EVANS KILLED? Why was Torsney acquitted? The shooting took place shortly before midnight, when Officer Torsney and his partner answered a radio report of an armed man in an East New York housing development where young Evans lived with his family. As the policemen left the building, Torsney was approached by the boy and five others. According to the *New York Times*, "Young Evans paused to speak to Officer Torsney, who pulled his gun from his holster and shot the boy in the head. He died several hours later."

Although Torsney claimed that he acted in self-defense, his legal defense was that "he was insane because of an epileptic psychomotor seizure suffered at the time of the crime." The 32-year-old policeman had no record of any previous epileptic attacks. Until the homicide, according to police personnel files, Torsney "had never fired his gun, had an unblemished record, and had no signs of emotional handicap." On the witness stand, the policeman testified that he had shot Evans "after he saw the boy reach into his waistband for what appeared to be a gun." No gun was found and none was seen by witnesses.

To maintain a defense of insanity, the accused needs a psychiatrist to support the claimed defense by means of expert testimony. Torsney had such a psychiatrist in the person of Dr. Daniel Schwartz, chief of forensic psychiatry at Kings County Medical Center (who had earlier testified that David Berkowitz, otherwise known as the Son of Sam, was schizophrenic and was psychiatrically unfit to stand trial). Dr. Schwartz lent his prestige and persuasive powers to the task of convincing the jury to acquit Torsney: Not only did he claim that Torsney suffered from psychomotor epilepsy, but also that the policeman had had an attack at the

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KAROL KOTAS

moment of the shooting, that the shooting was the result of the epilepsy, and that Torsney "acted automatically and suffered from organically caused amnesia."

It is, of course, the task of the prosecution to demolish such psychiatric claims. In this case, however, the prosecution called on a psychiatrist who believes that virtually everyone is mentally ill. Dr. Herbert Spiegel, clinical professor of psychiatry at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons and a well-known "hypnotist," testified that the policeman "suffered from hysterical dissociation, an emotional rather than an organic disorder that is not categorizable as legal insanity."

The judge gave the jury a choice among five possible verdicts: second-degree murder, first-degree manslaughter mitigated by extreme emotional disturbance, second-degree manslaughter, not guilty by reason of insanity, or self-defense. The jury brought in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

Torsney has been ordered confined for observation for 60 days in a facility of the State Mental Hygiene Department to determine whether he is a "danger to himself or to the community." According to the *New York Times*, because Tornsey's "insanity had a specific organic cause," he may retire from the police force on a full medical disability pension.

THE FACTS SPEAK FOR themselves. Randolph Evans, a 15-year-old black, is killed by a white policeman before numerous witnesses. The killing was unprovoked, a fact tacitly acknowledged by the defendant's own insanity plea (which implies that, but for his alleged insanity, he would be guilty of the killing). A white psychiatrist testifies for the defense that Robert Torsney was "legally" insane at the time of the offense; another white psychiatrist testifies for the prosecution that Torsney was "illegally" insane. Finally, a white jury acquits Torsney, leaving the unprovoked killing of an innocent person unpunished. I hold my fellow psychiatrists largely responsible for this stubborn and willful destruction of law and justice.

Such, at least, is the message I draw from these facts. When I say that "the facts speak for themselves," I speak, of course, metaphorically. Facts don't speak, only persons do. What, then, do other psychiatrists hear when listening to these facts? Remarking on this same case, as well as on several other recent cases of "trying the mad"—such as that of the Michigan woman, also acquitted as not guilty by reason of insanity, who killed her husband by pouring gasoline on him while he was sleeping and then setting him on fire—Alan A. Stone, professor of law and psychiatry at Harvard University, comes to a totally different conclusion. "Reading about these developments," he writes in the *New York Times*, "the public seems to get angry at psychiatry and psychiatrists. Yet the current situation is the work of judges, lawyers, and legislators; psychiatrists play a minor if inept role."

Although partly true, such a judgment exonerates psychiatrists of a responsibility that is, in my opinion, wholly theirs—that is, the responsibility for supporting the insanity defense. Let us again recall in this connection the accusations now so fashionably leveled against Russian psychiatrists for "abusing their profession." Dr. Stone has not, to my knowledge, defended these Soviet psychiatrists by claiming that they "play a minor if inept role" in incarcerating dissidents in madhouses. Why not? Surely, because of the differences between Soviet and American societies, such an excuse would be more valid for Russian psychiatrists than for American psychiatrists. Why, then, should we accept Stone's plea of ineptness on behalf of his colleagues, the true nature of whose deeds is becoming increasingly difficult to disguise?

I submit that the courtroom psychiatrist who seeks to exonerate a killer of responsibility for his act is, from a moral point of view, an accomplice to the act of taking an innocent life. Psychiatrists choose whether to testify in court or not, just as people choose whether to kill or not. Psychiatrists who aid and abet the insanity defense are no more inept than their accomplices are insane. Instead of calling such acts inept or insane, we ought to call them wicked and immoral. Not until we do so will our homes and streets be safe from criminals, and our laws and courts from psychiatrists. ❏

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POLITICS

JEFFREY STEIN

Espionage circus

ONE DAY EARLY LAST MONTH, FBI agents undoubtedly trailed a heavyset Vietnamese man down into one of Washington's modern subway stations. Watching in fascination from a discreet distance, they saw him sidle up to a well-dressed man in a trench coat, exchange a few words and a couple of slips of paper, and walk off.

One of these two men was arrested last week on charges of spying for Hanoi. The other is a former director of the CIA.

"We were both in a hurry," William E. Colby recalled last week, "so we just exchanged cards and said we'd get together someday."

Colby's friend was David Truong, who was picked up on January 31 along with a State Department employee, Ronald Humphrey, and charged with espionage in the service of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the case was Dinh Ba Thi, Hanoi's former ambassador to the United Nations.

Colby had known Truong from the old days in Saigon, where David's father had been a prominent lawyer and, at one point, governor general of Rotary International for Southeast Asia. In 1967, Truong Dinh Dzu, playing on some of his American contacts, ran as a "third force" candidate for the South Vietnamese presidency and lost. Nguyen Van Thieu, who won, threw him in jail. The case became an international cause célèbre and propelled David, then an economics student at Stanford, into antiwar politics. One of the people he sought to lobby from time to time was his old family friend William Colby, who had glided to the top rung of the CIA in 1973 after brilliantly administering the agency's Phoenix program in Vietnam—a program that sought to root out local Communist leadership via capture, assassination, and defection.

"We would have a general discussion based on my acquaintance with his father and mother," Colby reminisced last week, "and after a few words along those lines, a general discussion about how the war was going and what it was all about and, you know, polite differences of opinion." They made an odd couple.

Over the past few years, they met together "three or four" times, Colby recalled. Dinner with the CIA chief, according to Truong's friends, was something he liked to brag about. "I don't recall dinners," Colby said, "but it's entirely possible."

TRUONG WAS NOT AVAILable for comment. He was occupying a solitary cell in the Alexandria, Virginia, city jail, allowed only one visitor per week and one telephone call per day. The arrest of Truong and Humphrey, the Justice Department crowed in press releases, was the culmination of a "two-year investigation." Yet the secret documents that the charges say they funneled to Hanoi seem to be little more than the meandering musings of bored American diplomats.

Could it be that David Truong, an ambitious—and by some accounts manipulative—operator who caused much consternation in antiwar circles with his unusual range of contacts, fell into a trap the government had wanted to spring for years?

For example, one of the ironies in this so-called espionage case is that, although he liked to pass himself off as a key contact with Hanoi in the United States during the war, Truong was usually wrong about Communist intentions and actually knew very little. A notorious mishap occurred in late 1976, when Truong passed word to Senator Mark Hatfield that Hanoi was ready to drop all preconditions and discuss the Missing-in-Action question. Hatfield told the State Department and State told the White House—and everybody ended up with egg on his face when Truong's "message" from the Communists turned out to be absolutely false.

The point, as both Truong's friends and detractors point out, is that the young man—moving ever leftward through the 1970s from his "third force" politics of accommodation—felt driven to ingratiate himself with the Communists. Supplying them with innocuous classified documents, if in fact he did so, would have been just one more way to do it.

In 1976, Truong asked for a visa to travel to the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam—a desire he often expressed to friends—and was rebuffed. This is not the response generally given to a trusted secret agent.

The timing of the indictment, as well as Humphrey's reputation in some activist circles as a leaker of documents, has led Truong's defenders to charge that the government's aims in bringing the case are political, including intimidation of those who leak unfavorable information. As Jerry Berman, the American Civil Liberties Union's Washington legislative counsel, notes, the prosecution surfaced at a time when a tremendous battle is being waged over reorganization of the intelligence community and future guidelines on government snooping. "Any kind of espionage case that has this kind of high visibility," Berman says, persuades people "that we can't really afford to close down these intelligence agencies, and that we've got to give them the power to watch suspicious people."

POLITICAL TRIALS VETERAN William Schaap (now editor of the *Military Law Reporter*) adds: "The government is in effect saying with these indictments, 'If it weren't for wiretaps, we couldn't have caught these spies.' " Schaap also called attention to the ongoing trials of FBI agents for illegal break-ins and the government's general frustration, going back to the Pentagon Papers case, at not being able to control leaks.

On February 9, the Senate Intelligence Committee reported its recommendations for a new intelligence agencies charter, which would include authorization for the government to use warrantless wiretaps on foreign nationals in the United States as well as on American citizens suspected of trafficking with alien intelligence services. The ACLU had already protested another recommendation: giving carte blanche to the National Security Administration to eavesdrop on telephone conversations which *may* involve government "secrets."

A further clue to unraveling the government's real motivations in the case came in the week following the indict-

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ments, when the *Washington Post* reported that President Carter had personally approved television surveillance of Humphrey without a court order. It is clear that elements of the administration's national security team want to test this kind of surveillance in the courts.

In addition, some 200 agents, the first wave of more than 800 pink-slipped veterans of the CIA's clandestine operations department, are due to hit the sidewalks next month. All these shakeups and trials have led to a loud outpouring of doomsaying in the press, especially *Time* and *Newsweek* (which asked rhetorically about the CIA on its February 6 cover, "How Badly Hurt?").

Berman also suggested that—finally—here was a case where the government could prosecute with little fear of revealing any more real secrets, a problem which has plagued national security cases in the past. (In 1976, for example, a Thai national who had once been a CIA agent was arrested on charges of smuggling heroin into the United States. When his lawyer began discovery motions to uncover his CIA relationship, the case was dropped.)

FEW OF THE DOCUMENTS cited in the Truong-Humphrey-Thi indictments would interest anyone other than a newspaper reporter. Or as Truong's lawyer at the bail hearing put it, "These documents are the kind you read about in Jack Anderson, James Reston, the *Washington Post,* or the *New York Times.*" The most sensitive of them, a summary of Sino-Vietnamese relations by a U.S. diplomat in Hong Kong, is labeled "Secret," the government's second-to-lowest classification. But day after day, just this kind of low-level "insider" stuff, enhanced with a security classification, makes reporters salivate and dream of front page stories.

"There sure as hell are few people in the government leaking anything today," said an activist friend of Truong's after the judge set bail at a quarter of a million dollars for these "serious, extremely serious" charges.

Surely Ronald Humphrey didn't seem to believe he was involved in espionage when, in the custody of federal agents, he jumped out of the car in front of the courthouse and CBS News microphones caught him grimly muttering, "I am not a spy. . . ." No one has yet figured out *his* defense, however. Prosecutors announced that Humphrey had "confessed to the information in the indictments," but the next day he entered a plea of not guilty. On the basis of his remarks to CBS and the prosecution's contention that he was "cooperating," Truong's associates had not counted him in on their plans for a political defense. Sources did say that Humphrey had retained—and then discharged—the civil liberties-oriented firm of Phillip Hirschkopf as defense counsel.

Some of the political fallout has already hit. After initially denying the charges, Hanoi's UN ambassador was later recalled by his government, and United States–Socialist Republic of Vietnam relations now appear to be worse than ever. This, some said, was a product of the Vietnam War, which is still being fought within the U.S. government. "I think there is probably disagreement within the U.S. government on how fast to normalize relations with Vietnam," said Le Anh Tu, a peace activist and fellow Vietnamese expatriate, "and I think that there's a group of people who continue to feel vindictive—people who have devoted virtually their whole lives to fighting for the wrong side and who feel extremely embittered and who hate the Vietnamese. I suppose it's like the French who lived in Algeria for a long time."

Carter personally approved the television surveillance without a court order.

Among Truong's closest friends are peace activists who have been lobbying lately in an effort to influence this internal debate. They want Carter to back a proposal—which the State Department rejected on January 7—to send emergency food aid to Vietnam. On the day of the indictments, FBI agents fanned out over Washington, Philadelphia, Boston, and the West Coast to "interview" such friends and antiwar associates of Truong. One team visited Ngo Vinh Long, a Vietnamese friend and radical historian in Cambridge, and demanded that he accompany them to headquarters. When he refused to go without a lawyer, they said they would be back, warning as they left: "You are implicated too." The Justice Department says the investigation "is continuing."

TRUONG'S FRIENDS SHOW every sign of fighting the government "tooth and nail," as one put it, in Truong's defense. Whether forces would be combined in Humphrey's defense also "has yet to be talked about," said one source. "You're really the first one to ask." Other sources said that Humphrey would be welcome in their defense plans if he wished.

A flurry of discovery motions intended to identify infiltrators, informants, and wiretaps—not only in the activist community, but in Vietnamese missions here and abroad—is likely. The defense team will be headed by Michael Tigar, who handled the cases of many people who ran afoul of the military draft system during the Vietnam War. It will also probably want to know if congressmen and senators were shadowed as part of the investigation.

Already, Tigar has moved for a change of venue from Virginia to Washington, where the lower courts have handed down decisions prohibiting the government from conducting warrantless surveillance. The struggle over surveillance guidelines will no doubt be central to the case on several levels. Dinh Ba Thi is now out of the government's reach after a confusing last-minute attempt to hold him here as a material witness. Truong and Humphrey, of course, cannot be required to testify against themselves. The government says it is prepared to produce an informant in court, although such testimony does not always live up to expectations. That leaves the Carter-approved warrantless television surveillance of Humphrey and any photographs the FBI might have taken of materials being passed from one defendant to another.

Right now, however, the slowly-forming "defense committee" has one priority: making sure it screens out more infiltration by government agents. For years the activists thought they had been infiltrated. Oddly enough, one person whom they suspected of being a CIA agent, because he was so often wrong and liked the company of a CIA director, is now sitting in the Alexandria jail, the object of their defense. ❑

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LAW

STEPHEN ARONS

A case of compulsory education

"LISTEN," STATE SOCIAL worker Robin Joslyn said as he stood on the darkened doorstep of Lou and Nancy Wilson's house, "we weren't at the hearing. All we know is that we've got orders to come and take your children." Even that was more than the Wilsons knew at nine o'clock on that April 1, 1977 night as they opened the door of their Shutesbury, Massachusetts, home to be confronted by two state troopers and two social workers. The Wilsons hadn't been at the ex parte hearing either. In fact, they hadn't even been notified that the Children's Protective Service of Franklin County had petitioned the court to take custody of their four children because the Wilsons, acting on their beliefs as members of The Free Church, refused to send them to school.

The Wilsons' confrontation with the state of Massachusetts over the education of their children began on March 17, 1977, when the Shutesbury School Committee brought truancy charges against them. The Wilsons were never brought to trial, although they say they would have welcomed such a forum to publicize their educational philosophy and compare it with that of the government-supported school. In his preparation for the hearing that never materialized, Lou Wilson characterized public schooling as institutionalized "discrimination against intuition in favor of a cognitive-laden curriculum," resulting in "poverty of imagination and spirit." Wilson, who is the founder of The Free Church, said he saw a link between "the technology of cognitive valuation" and "the technology of competitive and warring economic enterprise."

Wilson was sometimes eloquent and often insistent in his criticism of public education. His daughter Laura was quieter and more personal. Her views seem all the more compelling for their lack of reliance upon scholarly authority. In an eight-page affidavit she prepared in connection with one of the later court hearings, Laura Wilson (then sixteen years old) said:

> . . . that I personally spent seven years in public schools . . . that I know state schooling to be a dehumanizing experience; that I know state schooling does not cultivate those things I believe to be of real importance in a person: honesty, compassion, gentleness, strength . . . that in all conscience, I cannot dishonor God by acknowledging the state as having the power to control the sacred process of learning . . . that I believe religion to be valueless unless it is part of a total life-process; that learning or "education" is an irresistible and unfolding part of life, is a personal responsibility between the individual and his God.

If given a public hearing, these views might have survived the compulsory attendance law. Massachusetts state law allows parents to educate their children at home when the local public school superintendent has approved the program of instruction in advance. In fact, the Wilsons intended to submit their own educational program—one consistent with their religious and family values. But neither the program nor the hearing materialized.

On April 1, the Children's Protective Service sought to convince Judge Alan McGuane that the Wilson children were abused and neglected; thus fit subjects for State Welfare Department custody. While the Wilsons claimed the issue was their dissent from schooling, the Children's Protective Service claimed there were other flaws in the family fabric. In the words of one Children's Protective Service official, the education issue was "one reason the children were deprived, but there are also about seven other reasons." Under Chapter 119 of the Massachusetts General Laws the court may, after complaint and hearing, find a child to be "without necessary and proper physical, educational, or moral care and discipline," or to be "growing up under conditions or circumstances damaging to a child's sound character development," and commit said child "to the custody of the Department of Public Welfare."

THE WILSONS WERE NOT present when the Care and Protection Order was heard. They were, therefore, unable to refute the charges that the children were "not fed," "had no education," and lived in "a sort of stolen house." The state also claimed that the children were effectively parentless because Rhode Island was seeking to extradite Nancy on a charge of writing two bad checks for a

ELLEN BLONDER

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total of $42.50 and Lou on a charge of extorting $5000 from a parent whose child had accompanied the Wilsons to a New Mexico free school the previous year. At the ex parte hearing, there were no witnesses with any personal knowledge of the allegations, no attorneys for the children or parents, no cross-examination or confrontation of witnesses—in short, no due process of law.

On the night of April 1, when the state police and social workers came to seize the Wilson children, a compromise was struck whereby the Wilsons agreed to appear with their children in court the next morning. On April 2, the Wilsons and their attorney sought in court to have the custody order dissolved as being without basis in fact and as a denial of due process. The investigating psychologist was prepared to testify that he could find no reason to remove the Wilson children from their home. Judge Harvey Kramer scheduled a hearing for April 5. In the meantime, the Welfare Department agreed to allow the children to remain with their parents.

It is difficult to get a clear picture of the April 5 proceedings because they are not a matter of public record. It appears, however, that although there was no evidence to substantiate the charges under Chapter 119, the judge awarded temporary custody to the Department of Public Welfare pending an investigation of the family and a further hearing on June 9. The children were taken from their family.

FROM THIS POINT ON, THE case became even more problematical. In an attempt to bring the educational issue to the forefront, the Wilsons spent considerable time talking with local groups, writing articles for local papers about their beliefs, inviting and receiving support from such people as Daniel Berrigan, and generally trying to transform their problem from a personal to a public issue. One letter of support came from Judge Bruce Wright of the New York City Civil Court. He responded to the seizure of the children by saying, "All of us who value such freedoms as exist in the spirit of the Constitution owe allegiance to the Wilsons and their fight to educate the state and to reclaim their offspring."

Still others made Lou Wilson a symbol of righteousness. He seemed to stir up pervasive antiauthoritarian emotions and to articulate resentments against government oppression through state sponsored schooling. Wilson seemed pleased enough to rise to such sainthood, even if temporarily. But like all heroes produced largely by the desires of their supporters to avoid painful ambivalences, Wilson had to fall.

The publicity campaign also aroused angry opposition, much of which was directed at the Wilsons' lifestyle and Lou Wilson's personal history. Before long it became known that he had been through two previous marriages and had been accused of a felony in Rhode Island, that his financial affairs were a mess, and that The Free Church was seen by some as a device to take advantage of First Amendment protections for the free exercise of religion. In the press and in the local gossip, it was suggested that Wilson had presented himself as a "therapist" and "minister," worming his way into troubled families and making off with children and money under the guise of providing alternative education. People who might have supported the Wilsons' right to educate their own children in their own way found themselves speculating about whether Wilson was some kind of sophisticated degenerate.

To some, Wilson was a symbol of righteousness; to others, a sophisticated degenerate.

The pressures of losing the children, state welfare investigations, court hearings, legal expenses, and public attention took their toll. Wilson had no job and was so preoccupied with the case that he sought none. The family lost its house and survived only with help from friends and contributors. They lived with friends, moving from one house to another until everything finally fell apart. In December, after several hearings had been postponed, all parties consented to an agreement which effectively split the family and buried the issue of education.

AFTER TEN MONTHS OF PER- sonal, political, and institutional war with all sides claiming to act in the "best interests" of the children, the Wilsons are splintered and scattered. The issue of parental objections to the content of their children's schooling has been buried, and the contestants are exhausted. Nancy and Lou Wilson have separated. The oldest children, aged seventeen and fifteen, are in technical custody of their natural mother (although one still lives with her stepmother, Nancy, and the other is living temporarily with his attorney). Michele, twelve, lives with Nancy. Lou, Jr., eight, has gone back to his natural mother, whom he had not seen in five years. Lou, Sr., is free on bail while awaiting trial on extortion charges in Rhode Island. And The Free Church, formed as a nonviolent, noncompetitive communal witness to "learning as healing" has become just a corporate shell.

In the wake of all the formal charges, investigations, tracts and hearings, it is easy to lose sight of the people who are at the center of the conflict—the Wilson children. It is an interesting fact that the older children seem to have an honesty, an emotional sophistication, and a spiritual presence exceeding that of most adults I have met. While visiting one of my classes, one of them wondered aloud, "What would happen if the Children's Protective Services brought charges against a family with children in public school, and claimed that subjecting the kids to those competitive, authoritarian, materialist pressures was parental neglect and abuse?"

The case might seem to be simply a passing controversy with great symbolic value but little practical significance, except for the fact that the Wilsons' dilemma is being repeated or threatened in other families. In the last two months I have personally been contacted by four other local families with the same desire to educate their children at home and the same legal and social institutions breathing down their necks. It is to be hoped that those who raise by their actions, rather than just their words, deep questions about our educational system will not be ground down by the state while the rest of us, who agree in principle, wait passively for a family pure enough to carry our burdens. ❑

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DISPATCH

PETER BRIMELOW

Canadian cul-de-sac

THE CONFEDERATION known as Canada may have reached a dead end. As the victory of the separatist Parti Québécois in the Quebec provincial election of November 15, 1976, revealed, Canada is a country at the point of disintegration. For Canadians (and all others) who were willing to look, the election was like the lightning flash in Robert Louis Stevenson's *Kidnapped*, which revealed to the hero of the tale that the staircase he was groping up ended in thin air. The ardent desire of the French to preserve their own culture, the differing interests of the provinces in the east and west, the thinness of any unifying patriotic sentiment, and the unimaginative policies of the ruling Liberal Party, all have combined to create this situation.

For years, English Canada had blindly accepted the bilingual prescription of the governing Liberal Party—which is equivalent to the U.S. Democratic Party but with an even keener instinct for survival—that quotas, language guarantees, and subsidies would somehow sedate the minority of 6 million French. Now, not only was the PQ in power, but even the defeated premier, leader of the Liberals' own Quebec wing, was expressing skepticism about the confederation he was supposed to be defending. And various prominent English Canadians were suddenly confessing to a total pessimism, which they had nurtured in secret as long as the Liberal prescription was a seldom questioned orthodoxy. Ironically, when expressions of this despair made their way into the somewhat inbred Canadian media, the general public was not at all disconcerted by the despair of these prominent citizens or by the prospect of Quebec's departure. In fact the public was rather delighted. All this is further evidence that what preoccupies politicians in the federal capital of Ottawa, with Quebec just across the river, is remote, geographically and emotionally, from many of their constituents.

The staying power of the French Canadian instinct for autonomy is one of those political facts so elementary as to be frequently overlooked, especially in the practical, materialistic, unromantic world of English-speaking North America. It has been the predominant French Canadian theme since the *habitants* refused to aid the invading army of the American Revolution for fear of its proselytizing intentions. The bureaucrats, journalists, and academics of the PQ are effectively a new clerisy, filling the role played in the nineteenth century by the Catholic church in protecting the French farmers and their culture from the lure of the industrial melting pots. Everything in their history indicates that the French Canadians will forgo economic growth and prosperity and accept regulation, theocratic or socialistic, in order to remain *maîtres chez nous*.

THERE IS DEBATE AMONG French Canadians about the PQ, although significantly conducted in terms of what is best for Quebec rather than loyalty to the federal ideal. But cultural survival is a goal so universally accepted among the French that even the Quebec Liberals, when in power, were imposing French-only language laws that arguably trampled on the constitutional rights of the million English-speakers in Quebec. For years French Catholic schools rejected Catholic immigrants from European countries other than France; they now reject bilingual English students, apparently from fear of cultural adulteration.

The fierce intensity of this Québécois nationalism has, since the PQ victory, motivated the most bilingual of all Canadian groups, the Montreal Jews, to lead an exodus of the English-speakers from Quebec. Many are survivors of the holocaust, and sensing trouble, want no part of future ethnic turmoil. As the PQ tightens language regulations and forces businesses to work in French, the English minority is being edged out, even though some of their ancestors homesteaded in Quebec and largely built the city of Montreal. Emigration should make it easier for the PQ to win its promised referendum on separation, which is due sometime in the life of this government. An intense propaganda war is being waged for the vote of the still cautious French community. But if it loses the referendum, the PQ says it will simply hold others until it wins.

An equally significant but more obscure fact about Canada as a whole is the profound political malaise of the English-speaking majority. In part, this stems from a sectionalism more vehement than anything found in U.S. politics. Canadian provinces, with much wider powers than U.S. states, are virtually incipient nations. The western provinces unite with those of the east only in jealousy of central Canada (the province of Ontario and its burgeoning metropolis, Toronto). English Canada also lacks a unifying set of values. The fashionable "nationalism" developed in the late 1960s, which has taken the legislative form of restrictions on foreign ownership and investment, cannot be based on language and culture for fear of upsetting the French or other ethnic groups. The British Empire, under whose auspices Canada was formed and in whose name she sent boatmen to help Kitchener invade the Sudan and sent incredible numbers of volunteers to fight Afrikaners, Germans, and sundry other enemies of the Mother Country, is a bond of loyalty that has been erased utterly from the collective memory in the space of a generation. This has left a certain emotional void, which a combination of activism in international organizations and loving references to geography cannot fill.

WESTERNERS OFTEN SEE the new Canadian nationalism as largely an attempt by elite Toronto business and media interests to secure their hinterland from U.S. competition, and also, in part, as a product of the anti-American sentiments of left-wing intellectuals. And it is true that Canada's tariff system has historically subsidized Ontario and Quebec industry at the expense of the rest of Canada, which has thereby been denied access to cheaper U.S. goods. Now oil wealth in western Canada has increased the desire there to be rid of the Quebec problem. At the same time, there are undeniable affinities with the United States to the south. The reality is that most Canadians speak *English*,

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drink beer, watch the Rose Bowl on New Year's Day, and are ultimately indistinguishable from Middle Americans. Politically, English Canada is still unformed. The effort to satisfy Quebec has distracted English Canada from examining closely its own national character.

The present situation in Canada is largely the result of the longtime hegemony of the Liberals. The governing party rides on the back of both national communities like a circus acrobat standing on two horses. No other federalist party can challenge its hold on Quebec, a hold reinforced by patronage and tradition. These safe seats give the Liberals an enormous lead in obtaining a majority in the House of Commons. The necessary additional seats can usually be picked up in English Canada, where the party strives to occupy a consensus center-left position. By making bilingualism Canada's official dogma, the Liberals have been reshaping the country in their own image—virtually institutionalizing themselves. Only they have a substantial French base, and in Pierre Trudeau, with his French father and English mother, a symbolic Bilingual Man. For the Liberals, accordingly, Quebec separatism is the specter of death itself. This explains the extraordinary violence of their reaction to the terrorist outbreaks of 1970, when they declared martial law and imprisoned many perfectly innocent Québécois nationalists. But the present threat is more difficult for the Liberals to handle. Separatism is not just something that affects Quebec. It could destroy Canada's traditional rulers and may precipitate the breakup of English Canada.

ACTUALLY, IN VIEW OF THE fact that French and English Canadians differ culturally on almost every issue, the real surprise is that they made confederation work at all. There were French Canadian prime ministers of Canada before World War I, and Quebec's government has been in French hands since before 1867. Both communities seem to have tacitly agreed to pursue their own interests—commerce for the English; law, politics, and farming for the French—and to ignore the other. But with the growth of the Canadian state, which now intervenes in everyday life and absorbs 45 percent of the Gross National Product, points of conflict have multiplied. It matters what language the bureaucracy works in if you deal with it every day, if it supplies your power, educates your children, and invades your home through television. Language is one issue on which policy can't be fudged in the way that is characteristic of democratic politics. Organizations have to choose one or the other. The Québécois, conscious of immigration and of being surrounded by an English-speaking culture, fear that the choice—if left unregulated—will inevitably be English.

What happens next in Canada is a subject upon which Canadians themselves have fewer ideas than do foreign observers. So complete is the Liberal domination outside Quebec that after the 1976 Quebec election, the orthodox dogma of an eternal, indivisible confederation reestablished itself more strongly than before. All that can be discerned now are growlings that English Canada will not consider any economic links with a separate Quebec. This is patently ridiculous, but then the Anglo-Saxons are notoriously volatile and emotional. The Liberals' bankruptcy is so total that they can think of no alternative to their old policy. It is obvious that they have not decided what they would do if the French Canadians unilaterally declare independence, although when backed into a corner by questioners recently, Trudeau said he would use "the sword" to combat "illegal" separation.

The official line is to let the PQ conflagration burn itself out, which might well result in a monolingual Quebec, independent in every respect except for its continued representation in the federal parliament. And since the PQ refuses, with more logic than political sense, to participate in federal elections, those representatives would be Liberals. It is doubtful that such a situation—ludicrous as it would appear to all—could prove stable. It is more likely that there would be further fragmentation and that some of the English-speaking provinces would try for some sort of accommodation with the United States. ❏

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (CARTER-STYLE)

By MARCUS G. RASKIN

Don't be fooled by the administration's rhetoric. It is simply a new, more sophisticated disguise for the same old interventionist foreign policy.

IN 1973, MEN WHOSE ECONOMIC AND POLITIcal interests transcend any political party, who meet in private clubs like the Links Club of New York or the Metropolitan Club in Washington, began talking about the need to find a presidential candidate who could master the populist stance without being a populist. Their ideal was a man whose style would not be a public embarrassment, who would give the appearance of accessibility, who had learned the Eugene McCarthy method of going to the people with a cause, and who would not challenge the dominant American corporations and banks, the national security apparatus, or any of the governmental agencies and elites who befriend such institutions.

Their task was an urgent one, partly because a terrible war that they had once strongly supported was "winding down." By 1973, they were undercutting its purpose by their dissent and distaste for the occupant of the White House, Richard Nixon. Nixon was haranguing them with a most astonishing idea. He said that they had lost the will to govern. He and his group of arriviste millionaires—C. Arnholt Smith, Bebe Rebozo, and Clement Stone—together with White House operators like John Ehrlichman and Bob Haldeman—were seeking to set their own terms for the operations of the state and the corporation through centralization of power. These pretenders frightened the old oligarchs in ways that Senator Joe McCarthy had frightened the CIA and the Army some 20 years before. McCarthy, bored with hunting dentists as Communists, had extended his domain to generals and upper class officials in the CIA, men protected and nurtured by the oligarchs. They had destroyed McCarthy politically under the klieg lights of television. So it was with Nixon. The old oligarchs saw their chance when Nixon dithered and faltered by not burning the Watergate tapes or by acting with cruelty and dispatch against his many adversaries, including the head of IBM.

Once Nixon had lost the presidency, the question soon arose whether those who had initiated the Vietnam War, but who had then slunk off to law firms, corporations, and universities, could again return to political power without having to operate through surrogates. It is said that after a war is lost, those who lose that war cannot in the short term expect to survive its loss politically. They are required to give way to a new elite, one that is divorced from the war or its failure. At first, it appeared that the men who served as the initiators of the Vietnam War would not be able to return to power. But as it turned out, Nixon, then Ford and Kissinger, watched their ambassador, Graham Martin, scramble out of Vietnam with those who had served the American expeditionary force. Nixon and Ford were tagged the "losers," and those

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who initiated the war were able to reinstate themselves several years later.

To return to power the old oligarchs needed a legitimate but relatively obscure figure who talked morality and economy and knew where real power lay in the society. He would have to be a man who could restore allegiance to the old system and knew how to co-opt liberal forces who otherwise might overturn the entire checkerboard.

ENTER JIMMY CARTER OF PLAINS, GEORGIA—ambitious, hard-working, with a tenacious will and a readiness to do what was necessary to line up the forces of social change in support of the old order. With a disregard for pomp, he used his good sense and diligence to demonstrate that he had the vital trait common to most American presidents: missionary zeal. Jimmy Carter was hungry, and the established forces appreciate the hungry, the ambitious, and those who have what Edmund Wilson called "formidable tenacity of character." While the old oligarchs are publicly appalled at the antics of the self-promoter, they privately admire such a person, believing he can almost always be used for their purpose.

Sometimes, of course, political leaders get out of hand and fail to honor their debts to the oligarchs who helped them attain power. In fact, as Bertrand Russell noted, gifted political men often use the rich for their own purposes: "Caesar was helped to power by his creditors who had no hope of repayment except through his success; but when he succeeded he was powerful enough to defy them. Charles V borrowed from the Fuggers the money required to buy the position of Emperor . . . when he became Emperor he snapped his fingers at them and they lost what they had."

Nevertheless, we find that David Rockefeller, our modern Crassus, was rewarded by having at least 15 of his ambitious Trilateral Commission members named to the highest gov-



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ernment and cabinet positions. Like past presidents, Jimmy Carter chose for his cabinet men and women whose personal successes were related to such things as the emergence of the United States as a world empire, the expansion of the role of the national state (especially its security aspects), and the imposition of the dollar as key world currency. The previous government experience of men like State and Defense secretaries Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown was directly linked to America's imperial role, and especially to the logistical bureaucratic support needed to maintain that role.

Carter's cabinet appointments symbolized the restoration to power of the war initiators. Appointments were given to those who approved, planned, or embraced the Indochina War. (One of his appointees, Joe Califano, is a former Defense adviser who helped to coin the hideous phrase "body count" to describe the Vietnamese killed in search-and-destroy missions.) Such people, although they recognized the war as an economic miscalculation, never publicly opposed it.

Eight years later, at his confirmation hearings for secretary of State, Vance, who had served as Lyndon Johnson's negotiator at the Paris talks with the North Vietnamese in 1968, wondered why the United States had bothered with such an adventure. The favorable business and investment arrangements which the Vietnamese offered world corporations less than two years after the war ended affirmed a pragmatic belief: The war was a political error from the American standpoint, because it did not require a military solution. The North Vietnamese were open to becoming a market for U.S. goods and to economic development with American advice.

For Carter, who also supported the war, the ten-year-long American tragedy was a "mistake" only to the extent that its social cost exceeded the domestic political price American leaders could afford to pay for the war's continuation. Carter's national security assistant, Zbigniew Brzezinski, another of those who favored the war, is the critical actor in U.S.–Soviet relations. Following his advice, Carter has aggressively tested the Soviet leadership in a series of probing exercises that have employed both the carrot and the stick. Unlike Henry Kissinger, who saw the United States in a status quo role fighting a rear guard battle for "Western civilization," Brzezinski holds that the United States is a revolutionary nation, and that it need not be defensive in world affairs if it forges a grand vision. The strategy of this grand vision is to cause dissension within Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Brzezinski's assumption is that, even if this strategy fails, there will be little cost to the United States since the Soviets are weak. Furthermore, the United States has the option of changing its stand as long as the attacks on the Soviet Union are only of the type that cause grumbling in the Kremlin.

One instrument of the grand vision is human rights. President Carter's administration seeks to recapture the world image of moral champion, as promoted by Woodrow Wilson, while the same imperial mischief continues. Its political objective is to split elites within the Soviet Union and within its bureaucratic and scientific apparatus. There is also an internal salving purpose, for the trauma of the Indochina War left an ugly scar to be hidden from the American people. Officials in the Carter administration use the human rights issue as a device to mask the policies and devastating human costs of that war. Raising human rights as an issue has also given Carter some flexibility by allowing him to limit or moderate international commitments to leaders and alliance systems thought politically shaky or unpopular. Through the use of a scorecard on human rights, the United States can actively reconsider its various alliance systems (with the critical exception of NATO).

Brzezinski's grand vision includes the vectoring of Eastern Europe toward Western Europe through trade arrangements and skillful armaments and disarmament proposals which will isolate the "geriatric" and "inflexible" Soviet bureaucracy and leadership from the people it rules. When we seek to understand the attitudes of the Carter administration toward the Soviet Union, we should remember Brzezinski's awareness of East European history, a history easily overlooked by most Americans. Polish émigrés like Brzezinski see Poland as part of "Western civilization," and they feel that—with modest help from Western Europe—their native country can withstand both Communism and the Soviet Union. They see Russians as suspended in a sort of purgatory between Asia and the West. This mindset translates politically and diplomatically into a position that was followed against the Soviet Union after the First World War. At that time, Germany, France, and England, as well as the United States, believed that Poland and other states in Eastern Europe (Romania and Czechoslovakia) were critical to the policy of establishing the *cordon sanitaire* around the revolutionary fervor emanating from Russia. (We should not conclude, however, that the United States favors a military intervention in the Soviet Union, although the *cordon sanitaire* position is still present in Brzezinski's thinking and that of other national security advisers.)

SUCH RE-EVALUATIONS AND POLICY SHIFTS encased in preachy and moralistic language in no way impair the "inexorable" character of the 35-year-old national security bureaucracy that continues to produce plans for war, semi-war, covert operations, shows of force, and new weapons systems. These plans are always seductively available for implementation if a presidential party falters while using its economic tools for world primacy. On the other hand, Carter's policy makers are skeptical of the national security bureaucracy because of its "inflexibility." They do not quite know how or whether to change the mission of the bureaucrats whose raison d'être has been the devising of plans and capabilities for nuclear first strike, new weapons systems, military aid, and military intervention, covert and overt. This is partly because some members of Carter's presidential group operate from these assumptions. Thus, James Schlesinger's point of view in defense and national security matters remains the fundamental one that the bureaucracy actually uses to guide its daily operations. It is one to which Harold Brown, in the nature of his work, must remain pledged.

Carter's less bellicose contingent, including Anthony Lake (assistant secretary of State for policy planning), Paul Warnke (director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), Leslie Gelb (director of the State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs), Cyrus Vance, and James Leonard (deputy representative to the UN), know that they are viewed as woolly-headed by Schlesinger supporters like Dean Rusk, Paul Nitze, Eugene Rostow, and Charls Walker. This latter group started the Committee on the Present Danger, to counteract any policy changes in the U.S. Cold War posture, making sure that the rhetoric of nuclear or conventional disarmament does not become a reality, and that the loss in Vietnam does not radically change U.S.

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strategies.

There is little chance that the alliance system will be either ended or changed. The Carter administration has inherited the fantasy that 500,000 American troops are stationed abroad because the United States has legal commitments that it is required to defend militarily. In reality, the treaties are drawn in such a way that the United States has no military commitment to these nations except in case of attack, and then only through its own constitutional processes. On the other hand, if the United States were to remove its military forces from these various countries, it would mean that the American bureaucracy, corporations, and military were prepared to allow each of the 42 nations involved to operate according to its own purposes and be open to internal social transformation. For the United States, this would mean dismantling the national security apparatus, patiently constructed over a 35-year period, which supported the imperial program. What would those people in the military and national security establishment do if they were not preparing for a simultaneous strategic nuclear and non-nuclear war in different parts of the world?

American strategic and non-nuclear forces are arming at a faster pace today than under the Nixon administration, although the startling cost of the arms race ($160 billion by 1980) has caused some people, like Brzezinski, to say that only "poor and backward nations can afford" to have a war. Even so, an arms control agreement that would destroy future development of weapons and the defense industrial plant is economically and politically unpopular. The South and Southwest, Carter's cultural home, have gained much economic and political status from the arms race, and even from the Indochina War. And there is little to suggest that

The Carter administration has inherited the fantasy that 500,000 American troops are stationed abroad because the United States has legal commitments that it is required to defend militarily.

the military-minded wing of the Democratic Party, with its strength in Congress, and other Cold War allies, including the AFL–CIO leadership, would allow the arms acquisition process to lessen in intensity, especially if it meant a cut in future arms development and loss of jobs.

There is a movement within both the Carter bureaucracy and Congress to recommit American troops to NATO if an agreement is reached with the Soviet Union on strategic arms. Brookings Institution studies by Henry Owen (now Carter's special representative for Summit Affairs) and Barry Blechman (now assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) outline this "need." Such studies do not manifest a conscious wish to engage in a major war. However, they do provide the intellectual justification for war preparations, military maneuvers, and projects that demonstrate military power without direct military engagement. This imperial practice was once called "showing the flag."

There is a political purpose behind the presence of troops in advanced industrial countries that is similar to the U.S. military role in poor nations. Those who support the U.S. military "beefing-up" in Western Europe are concerned that as Western Europe unifies and turns to the left under a parliamentary coalition of social democrats, communists, and socialists, the United States will be required to increase its non-nuclear military presence to affect and shape Western Europe's internal politics. Article 9 of the NATO charter appears to allow internal interference if such actions can be rationalized in the context of a threat to peace and a claim of external aggression.

CARTER ADVISERS THINK THAT THE UNITED States has a far greater margin for error than the conventional analysts of post-Vietnam policy usually conclude. A number of people in the Carter administration participated in a public opinion study called "Principles for Defining the National Interest," published in September 1976. The conclusion was that "insofar as foreign policy professionals determine it, our foreign policy in the period just ahead will probably be characterized by continuity far more than sudden shifts or sharp departures. Also reassuring to those who see the United States as a nation consumed by self-doubt should be the considerable overlap in professional views and public attitudes on many key issues."

The assumption behind this study is that a consensus can be managed for virtually any series of tactical policy moves. The Carter administration analysis is grounded on three assumptions: that the United States will increase its trade in markets abroad to offset the U.S. balance of payments problem; that Carter will successfully restore the American self-image of goodness and idealism (for example, by talking extensively about human rights); and that the media can be muscled or hustled to support established power's interpretations of events and policies.

Because of its belief in policy flexibility, contradictory initiatives on a rhetorical level will be continued by the Carter administration. This parry and thrust tactic has the effect of confusing the bureaucracy and undercutting a unified and coherent position in national security policy. However, the reasons for Carter's inability to impose a single policy line on his administration are deeper than his tactics. They grow out of internal economic and regional conflicts within the United States, a differing assessment of the dangers of communism, competition between military and civilian budgets, the absence of a unifying national purpose that transcends competing policies and interests among ruling elites, and a split between those who believe in military force as the prime significant instrument in world affairs and those who favor economic levers as the mechanism for primacy. Because the Carter administration has no overall vision that it can sustain politically, it will resort to pragmatic methods of achieving certain goals, such as avoiding the sort of individual "mistakes" and "miscalculations" that Carter advisers believe led to the Indochina War.

Paradoxically, the administration's pragmatic goals can be achieved by appearing to make many mistakes. One such "mistake" is to be critical of all national governments, thus reaching over the heads of foreign leaders much in the manner that Carter has adopted internally in reaching over the heads of Congress through town meetings and call-ins. This method seeks to make public "family quarrels" with the specific purpose of risking all previous international arrangements with "friends" and "enemies." This is not as revolutionary as it appears; it is actually a classic approach to

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international politics. The Russo-German rapprochement in the 1920s is one such example; the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact is another. Anglo-French détente in the 1830s and 1840s and the German-Italian military alliance after 1935 are still others. But before there are such national shifts, elites constantly reassess their friends.

It is sometimes said that diplomacy is the history of deals struck between enemies against friends. This Machiavellian rule was practiced throughout the Cold War. Of course the public was told that the enemy was "X." But the reality was that America's problems were with "Y." It was only under Kissinger that this rule was publicly practiced, a change necessitated by the chaos created by the Indochina War. Thus, at the time of the August 1971 devaluation of the American dollar, Japan was treated summarily as compared to America's "enemy" China; and the Soviet Union enjoyed Great Power partnership status with the United States, both nations going over the heads of their respective allies on issues which the allies believed to be unshakable arrangements among them. The United States had no qualms about using its leverage with oil producing countries against Western Europe, as France and Germany charged during the 1973 "oil crisis." According to John Stoessinger, Western Europeans charged that "their capitals had become little more than refueling stops on [Kissinger's] way to or back from Moscow."

The "adversary as friend" rule will be used often in Brzezinski and Vance's time. Indeed, the United States could conclude arrangements with China or the Soviet Union if relationships with the Europeans or the Japanese deteriorate. Brzezinski has described this possibility:

> . . . a fundamental change in the very pattern of international relations is not to be excluded. We could find a situation a decade from now in which our relations with either the Soviets or the Chinese . . . are more stable, more predictable and less pregnant with hostility than our relations with either the Europeans or the Japanese. This, indeed, would be a fundamental reversal of world affairs, one which would undo the very thrust of much of American foreign policy since World War Two.

In reality, however, this is not quite the reversal Brzezinski suggests. In the past, the managers of the American empire have spent a considerable amount of time hiding the fact that state relations were more cordial with enemies than they were with friends.

TO ADOPT BRZEZINSKI'S INSIGHT AS THE basis for public policy necessitates a change in the public raison d'être for empire, the acquisition of weaponry, and the maintenance of the national security apparatus. Furthermore, the old-time religion of anticommunism is not perceived as strong enough to keep the interest of younger bureaucrats and military officers who quietly admire the guerrilla resistance of the Vietnamese and scorn the ideological dowdiness of the Soviet Union. The result is that a new generation of managers and bureaucrats believes the United States has no friends *or* enemies—only interests. They believe all ideals are suspect and, with the blessing of the old oligarchs, they seek a leader who will fashion a new set of ideals (outcomes) for them to pursue. Their calculating view of the world, honed at policy "sciences" institutes from Massachusetts to California, waits for a purpose and a master. Without a purpose, or with the wrong one, their cerebrations *will* tend to deepen American suspicion of both friendly and antagonistic nations, and this tendency will enlarge the pantheon of xenophobic fears that possess our nation from time to time. (For example, American anger has expanded to "the Arabs" and Israel without dropping the Russians from the pantheon.) The picture is further complicated by the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, who seeks to set an alternative course for American policy within the UN, and to organize support for his point of view within the government and in the society itself. Young seeks to formulate a foreign policy alternative that could cause the United States to favor people's liberation movements, and he could end up the unwitting ally of military interventionists who will take on anyone's cause as their own in order to justify intervention and empire.

We should not lose sight of another economic dimension to the slight shift in focus which Brzezinski predicted and which he seeks to bring about in international relations. The question of whether European, American, and Japanese economic interests can form a system of noncompetitive, U.S.-dominated trading arrangements is at best arguable. For example, European corporations, especially French ones, are now struggling with American corporations for the world's markets, with products ranging from reactors to jets and missiles. The questions American economic power faces are whether it can invade the markets of allies, exercising dominant control without military presence; whether it can coerce alignment of multinational corporations with American society's social needs; whether it can invest in Third World countries, thereby tying them to American trading patterns; whether it can continue covert control over cabinet members of other nations without moral rebellion within the United States; and whether it can continue to play the role of world banker.

The new generation of managers believes the United States has no friends or enemies—only interests. Their calculating view of the world, honed at policy "sciences" institutes, waits for a purpose and a master.

That latter question—America's role as world banker—is especially crucial, because without this role, according to Robert Roosa, former undersecretary of Treasury, "we might have been forced long ago to cut down our imports (perhaps through deflation of our economy), reduce materially our foreign investments, income from which makes a substantial contribution to our current balance of payments, and curtail, perhaps sharply, our military and economic assistance to our friends and allies."

Bankers, of course, to be believed, must give the appearance of prudence and technical competence. This is accomplished in our time by developing powerful social networks that involve private American bankers in the affairs of other countries while they are shaping U.S. governmental policy in the economic sphere. They must also promote the ideology that the dollar cannot be displaced as the basic international currency. As Carter's undersecretary of State, Richard Cooper, has pointed out, there is no clear, feasible alternative to the dollar as the "world's currency"; his task at State is to assure the world of the power of this "truth," and of the humane purpose of the great corporations.

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One way some of the intellectually-minded bureaucrats hope to finesse economic and military questions is by using technocratic solutions to the problems of disease, poverty, and war itself as instruments for imperial hegemony and stability. Economically, this is feasible for the United States since one-third of the world's trade is "invoiced and transacted in dollars," even though American trade's share of the world market is less than half of that amount. It is no wonder that the national security state is currently organizing the bureaucratic apparatus to take on "global systems" issues with a strong economic component. The managers of the state seek to concern themselves in a comprehensive way with seemingly value-neutral problems of population, scientific advances, the environment, and the elements. Kissinger presaged the Carter-Brzezinski and Vance positions in a speech in Los Angeles on January 24, 1975, when he said: "Progress in dealing with our traditional agenda is no longer enough.... The problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas, now rank with questions of military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda."

Widening the consciousness of concern properly to include these problems on the national security agenda reflects several tendencies within the bureaucratic and academic community. The most significant is the emergence of depoliticized planning or "scanning" ideas that are meant to focus intellectual and bureaucratic institutions on particular problems as if they were apolitical. Some examples are weather modification, elimination of ocean pollution, control of agricultural pests, and the movement of plutonium from one country to another. These are seen as national security questions that can be handled only by technocrats who will dictate the political result, but with police and military aid. This technocratic point of view holds "that issues of global environmental and regional interdependence are not easily separable from other economic and security aspects of foreign policy. Rather, these issues will be at the heart of foreign policy in coming decades, and this will have to be reflected in organizational arrangements." (Robert O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, "Organizing for Global Environmental and Resource Interdependence." Nye is now a State Department official.) This suggests the likely *extension* and reorganization of the national security state to include a new range of experts whose sophistication does not contradict the imperial stance, but instead seeks to make the state more relevant to scientific and other questions formerly left to civil society, accident, or chance.

CARTER'S ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES usher in a second and far more comprehensive stage of the national security state. Whereas previously it was an instrument to organize imperial stability and American dominance, its new task is the organization of nature according to bureaucratic notions of economic and technological interdependence. The type of collaboration that will be sought is meant to ensure U.S. corporate and technocratic preeminence within allied states and to nurture an international leadership and mandarin class whose members will have more in common with each other than with their own societies. The Trilateral Commission is a modern and minor example of economic connections between the rich and the powerful across national boundaries in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States for similar purposes of control.

As the second stage of the national security state emerges more clearly, we will be able to discern four tendencies that may well conflict with each other. The first tendency remains the more classic imperial one of Great Power hegemonic domination, with the state using the economic corporations for its own purposes, and also being used by them to assure export and import markets. This position remains related to American military force as the final arbiter of world relations.

The second tendency is the emergence of technocrats who see the world as a set of problems rather than a collection of enemies and friends. They see themselves as the carriers of the scientific method, applying their skills to weather modification, adequate international food supplies, and the disciplined control of modern technology. They seek the centralization of state bureaucracies, tight control over programs through national budgets, and the appearance of participation (read access) to organized groups in the body politic. Such policy intellectuals see themselves as the "brightest and best" in a new guise. They seek to merge three modern pursuits—organization, calculation, and information—as the means of making rational judgments and controlling the future for the present social structure. They believe that technocratic solutions justify their willingness to "cede elements of national sovereignty to international entities, which alone will be able to make and monitor the necessary decisions concerning world allocation and control of populations, food, nonrenewable resources, oceans and the like."

The third tendency within the national security state perpetuates military growth, covert activities, preparation for war, modern weaponry and research, and the reluctant fulfillment of old obligations to friendly satraps. Energy adviser James Schlesinger, senators like Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Henry Jackson, and the members of the Committee on the Present Danger represent this point of view.

There is a fourth ambiguous tendency of those who have been co-opted into the reorganized national security state. In the foreign affairs field, they are the lonely representatives of the dreams of the sixties. Andrew Young finds himself a proponent of liberation movements, calling for internal social transformation that achieves full employment, disarmament, and higher taxes for the rich and the upper middle class. The latter set of attitudes will tend to conflict with corporate and military bureaucratic needs and national technocratic attempts at colonizing the future, although Young appears to think otherwise. His civil rights experience is that the great corporations helped black people fight racism.

What the American people will support among these tendencies is hard to gauge. It is useful to remember that Carter, the engineer, came to political maturity in Georgia, where there was no conflict between the "small business" bankers and the peanut farmers, between the multinational corporations of defense (Lockheed) and pleasure (Coca-Cola), and black agitation for desegregation. Indeed, in Georgia, Carter believed these forces to be quite complementary. He concluded that the task of government was to manage these forces and show their interdependence. We should not forget that Carter's ideology of leadership borrows from the idea that the Word is more important than the social structure because it can transcend structure and institutions. We shall see. And we shall also see what his Word means when his choices among the tendencies cause backlash among those who thought his gospel was their gospel, and those he sets out to save.

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

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JAPAN: ROADBLOCK ON THE WAY OUT OF KOREA

BY FRANK BALDWIN

CANDIDATE JIMMY Carter's 1976 campaign statement, "I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea," was greeted with incredulous reserve in Japan. Troop withdrawal was regarded as a bit of down-home rhetoric, one of those curious things that happen in post-Vietnam American politics—until Carter won the election and seemed serious about a new Korean policy. Then members of

Japan has a huge stake in Korea—economically and militarily—and the Japanese government doesn't want the American troops there to go home.

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Japan's foreign affairs and defense establishment put down their cups of green tea and moved swiftly to block Carter's plans.

A year later the Japanese government is breathing somewhat easier over Korea. Aided by diverse allies—military, bureaucratic, and academic—in America, and by the desperate Park Chung Hee regime in Seoul, Japan has turned aside, at least temporarily, a minor threat to its "interests." Tokyo can live with the Carter administration's withdrawal plan announced in July 1977: The troop removal is stretched out over a period of five years, to 1982; U.S. Air Force units will remain indefinitely; and Washington will provide military equipment worth billions of dollars to South Korea's generals. In addition, the United States has reconfirmed its commitment to the Republic of Korea. There is open speculation in Japan about "face saving" moves by Carter—for example, the rotation of a U.S. Marine brigade from Okinawa to South Korea after 1982—which would avoid the removal of ground forces. And there is an even chance that Japan's objective of a permanent U.S. garrison in Korea may yet be realized.

The education of Jimmy Carter began before election day. Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentarō granted an interview to *Newsweek* (Nov. 1, 1976) to send a public shot across the candidate's bow: "If the American forces were to withdraw from the peninsula, it could create a very dangerous vacuum. . . . In that sense, the peninsula's peace is vital to Japan's peace and security." Carter had hardly gotten used to being president-elect when the Tokyo offensive began in full force. Maruyama Ko, vice minister of the Defense Agency, on November 8 warned that a withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea by the new administration would have serious consequences for Japan's defense plans. A former Japanese ambassador to South Korea echoed the sentiment in a newspaper interview the next day, first praising Park Chung Hee and then saying that "Japan strongly desires the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea." Kubo Takuya, former vice minister of the Defense Agency, writing in an *Asahi Shimbun* guest column on November 11, 1976, stressed the importance of the Korean peninsula to Japan's security and condemned any reduction in U.S. forces that might cause "North Korea to miscalculate."

A verbal torpedo had been launched from close quarters two days earlier. Togo Fumihiko, Japanese ambassador to Washington, spoke in Minneapolis against "upsetting the balance of power in Asia" and called for a "continued U.S. military presence in South Korea." It was the first of several attacks by Togo on Carter's new Korean policy. The ambassador's remarks were endorsed in Tokyo by the semi-official *Japan Times* on November 14: "The equanimity with which this [Togo's] statement was received here is a sign it represents the Japanese consensus. Togo's speech was, of course, cleared with the Foreign Ministry. . . ." An American embassy official in Tokyo commented that it was "unprecedented" for a Japanese ambassador "to run around the United States making critical public speeches."

Japan likes the status quo in Korea. A single government on the peninsula would be a formidable economic rival and possibly a military irritant.

THE MESSAGE REACHED Plains, Georgia. In November Carter quickly promised that his administration would consult Japan about the removal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Aware that Nixon and Kissinger had mangled relations in 1970–1972 through secrecy and duplicity, Carter was sensitive to "style," the appearance of equality, in dealing with Tokyo. He sent Vice President Walter Mondale to Tokyo shortly after the inauguration to emphasize the importance of ties with Japan and to explain his new Korean policy. Carter promised "consultation" and "no surprises" (announcing the removal of U.S. forces from South Korea had not been bad for openers!). Consultations on troop withdrawal began in March 1977 when Premier Fukuda Takeo visited Washington. They continued in May and July as high-level Pentagon and State Department officials briefed their counterparts in Tokyo.

There is no "Japanese consensus" on Korea, despite attempts by U.S. (and Japanese) opponents of Carter's Korean policy to buttress their attacks by citing "the Japanese view," as if there were only one. The Japan Socialist Party, the Clean Government Party, and the Communist Party are on record against American military intervention there. A parliamentary delegation, which included members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), signed a joint statement in P'yongyang on September 6, 1977, calling for the complete withdrawal of foreign troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea. Many intellectuals, human rights groups, and much of the media are hostile to the Park regime. Important business leaders, speaking of the "South Korean threat," have called for an end to "economic assistance" to Seoul. The public, generally indifferent to whatever happens on the peninsula, is not noted for a high regard for the Korean people.

The November broadside and the statements that followed (as the Carter plan was unveiled) represent Japanese government policy. That policy is supported mainly by the great majority of the LDP, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Agency, and part of the business community. What do they want from the United States in Korea?

JAPAN PREFERS THE STATUS quo: the division of the peninsula into two competing regimes with renewed conflict and unification prevented by a U.S. military presence. Peaceful unification is almost as anathematic as unity gained through military action. A single government on the peninsula would be a formidable economic rival and possibly a military irritant. Just as Europe feels more comfortable with two Germanys, Tokyo prefers (but with no similar historical experience as a rationale) two weak states on the peninsula rather than one strong nation of 50 million Koreans.

The official view is based on diverse Japanese "interests" related to Korea: security, economics, refugee policy, the Korean minority in Japan, and a web of profitable relationships between Japanese and South Korean politicians and corrupt businessmen. At the security end of the spectrum, Japan has a

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legitimate stake in U.S. force levels in Korea, a true national interest. Security aside, however, there is nothing in the rest of the "interests" list that the United States is obligated to defend and much that is abhorrent to Japanese and Americans alike. Even the security interest is usually exaggerated. (This ploy is used less in Japan than by status quo advocates in America who are trying to sabotage withdrawal.)

Japan's security is affected by U.S. force levels in South Korea in three ways. First, the removal of U.S. troops might trigger another war. North Korea's policy of peaceful unification may give way to a blitzkrieg bid for victory once U.S. atomic weapons and troops are gone. Another scenario sees the collapse of South Korea as a result of labor and student unrest, an erosion of confidence in the ROK's viability, disaffection with President Park's dictatorial rule, the attraction of the North Korean alternative, and rivalries among ROK generals. P'yongyang might take advantage of the confusion to deliver the *coup de grâce*. Conversely, a desperate President Park may try to prevent a U.S. withdrawal or the collapse of his regime by launching a preemptive strike against the north, perhaps when Kim Il Sung dies.

No matter how a war starts, the Japanese government would have to make no-win decisions about Washington's use of bases and facilities there. To support U.S. intervention in Korea would be unpopular, probably fatal to the cabinet in power. A refusal to endorse American actions would render the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty a scrap of paper and would kick the main prop from beneath U.S.-Japanese relations. Since the United States probably would act unilaterally if the military situation deteriorated rapidly, hesitant leadership could lose both popular support and the confidence of its principal ally. Naturally, no politicians want to face that nightmare.

A second adverse effect on Japan's security might result from a Korea unified under a Communist government. There is apprehension that North Korea would provide bases or naval facilities to the Soviet Union, thereby extending the bear's paw down to the Tsushima Straits. Russia is the only credible strategic threat to Japan. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are deployed in northern Honshu and Hokkaido against a Russian invasion; air defenses are designed to provide early warning against a Soviet air attack. The USSR's "eastern expansion" is the primary concern of the Japanese analysts. If Moscow achieved the czarist dream of a port on the Korean peninsula, it would affect the strategic balance in the region and complicate the SDF naval mission in nearby waters.

From Tokyo's perspective, the third effect of a withdrawal from South Korea is on the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee for Japan itself. American ground forces in the ROK are readily available for Japan's defense without the annoyance of having them based there. A willingness to bear the risk and cost of maintaining troops in Northeast Asia demonstrated Washington's capability of responding in the region. Nixon started the reduction of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Ford closed out the Indochina debacle, and now Carter is pulling back from Korea. While U.S. forces are removed from Asia, more are deployed to NATO. Defense and political specialists in Japan naturally wonder when the American "retreat" will stop. Is the day coming when Washington will no longer see a national interest in holding the nuclear umbrella over the Japanese archipelago? In short, suspicions have arisen that the withdrawal from South Korea presages a final retreat to bases in Micronesia and Hawaii.

Of the issues raised by the threatened U.S. withdrawal, none is more emotional for the Japanese than the prospect of Korean refugees streaming to Japan.

BUT TO STATE THAT Japan's security *may* be affected is not to concede the Japanese a veto over American policy. After more than three decades of sacrifice and danger in Korea, the United States is entitled to reduce both even if it raises hypothetical dilemmas in Tokyo. Japanese officials admit this privately; naturally, they will not say it publicly. Even if a Communist government gains control of the entire peninsula, it would have to maintain a delicate neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. A sensible Korean regime will not favor one giant neighbor at the cost of relations with the other. In the 29 years of its existence North Korea has not given bases to either Peking or Moscow.

Finally, defense studies in Japan and the United States have shown that the security commitment to Japan is *separable* from involvement in Korea. The complex force-disposition issue is summed up by Professor Momoi Makoto, National Defense College: "If I were an American, I would insist on removing the U.S. troops from South Korea. It is unnatural to keep troops in another country forever. At the same time, if you want to remain a Pacific power, I would pay attention to changes in the strategic environment in the region and increase your naval forces by one task force . . . I think you could then counter the Soviet Union's expansion toward the Northeast Pacific."

Another Japanese concern is protecting Japan's economic interests in South Korea. Behind the screen of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons in South Korea, Japan has developed a considerable economic stake since relations were normalized in 1965. Exports to Seoul in 1976 amounted to about $3.2 billion; imports were about $1.8 billion. From 1966 to 1976 Japan enjoyed a $7.8 billion favorable balance in this trade, a pretty pile of yen. Yet the economic interest is also often exaggerated. That 11-year total was still less than Japan's surplus with the United States *last* year. The 1976 exports to the ROK were only 4.6 percent of Japan's total exports, while imports were 2.8 percent. No essential raw materials were imported from South Korea.

Japanese investments in South Korea are mainly in labor-intensive industries attracted by low wages and antiunion labor policies. South Korea is also a useful site for heavily polluting industries, which can no longer be placed in Japan because of recent environmental laws. Japanese investments in South Korea amount to about $700 million, a small share of Japan's overseas investments. These trade and investment amounts are not to be sneezed at, of course. The business interests and the politicians who share

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If the Carter administration caves in to Japanese pressures, the best opportunity in three decades to reduce a misguided Asian commitment will be lost.

the profits through rebates, "commissions," and illegal political contributions will defend them to the last American GI. Nonetheless, with Japan's GNP in the $500 billion class, no one seriously claims that South Korea is a vital economic interest.

OF ALL THE ISSUES raised by the threatened U.S. withdrawal from Korea, none is more important, or more emotional, for the Japanese than the prospect of Korean refugees streaming across the 115-mile Tsushima Straits. If a war breaks out they will come by air and sea, in commandeered military aircraft and private planes, in ROK navy vessels, freighters, ferries, fishing boats, rowboats, anything that floats. An authoritative Japanese study estimates that a million Koreans will flee to Japan, a one-way civilian Dunkirk. To the government of Japan there is no more repugnant prospect than an "unwashed horde" of Koreans claiming assistance and asylum.

There are presently about 650,000 Koreans in Japan. They are the vestige of the World War II forced labor programs that brought millions of Koreans to work in mines and factories from Kyushu to Hokkaido. The Koreans have been discriminated against in education, employment, housing, marriage. As a despised minority with limited options, some have turned to marginal occupations and crime. The average Japanese, particularly of the older generation, holds a very negative stereotype of Koreans. Examples are legion. When Japanese men argue angrily, the ultimate insult is "You Korean!" Even a professional baseball star of Korean descent, Horimoto Isao of the Tokyo Giants, is frequently taunted with ethnic insults from the stands. Postwar attitudes are less bigoted but the prewar generation runs the country.

Japan wants no more Koreans. Fighting on the peninsula or the collapse of the ROK would pose ugly alternatives. One study suggests that the Maritime SDF might be positioned in the Tsushima Straits to turn back refugees, by force if necessary. The resultant damage to Japan's reputation perhaps rules this out. The refugees would probably be allowed to land. Although relief measures would be expensive, the real issue is, Would the Koreans be allowed to stay in Japan?

Vietnam provides a current precedent. Despite years of support for U.S. intervention in Indochina and billions of dollars in war profits, the Japanese government does not allow Vietnamese refugees who reach Japan to remain. They are permitted to stay only until they are processed for settlement in the United States or other countries. Newspaper exposés of neglect and indifference toward the refugees' plight have not swayed official thinking. Refugees are not welcome, period. Korean refugees are doubly unwelcome. Whatever the world may think of such a policy, most Japanese prefer a homogeneous society free of racial or ethnic antagonisms.

Under current policy Tokyo will ask Washington to accept the million refugees. Since even Uncle Sam is not likely to be that big a patsy and because liberal sentiment in Japan deplores such harsh irresponsibility, the government would probably have to relent and allow several hundred thousand Koreans to stay.

Refugees would compound the Korean minority problem in many ways. Japan has not ratified the two UN human rights covenants that became effective in January 1976 because they require changes in domestic laws that would improve the legal status of Korean residents. A unified Korea would make an issue of racial discrimination. Japanese officials freely admit that they will have to treat Koreans differently if the peninsula is united.

Desirable as the status quo of a divided Korea is, Japan cannot take over the U.S. military role. Legal restraints, public attitudes, and the LDP-opposition balance in the Diet rule out any military involvement. While Article IX, the "Renunciation of War" clause in the postwar constitution, has been bent enough to permit the right of self-defense and the possession of defensive weapons, the dispatch of the SDF overseas is out of the question, politically unthinkable. The SDF's strength and armament are barely adequate for its mission of defending Japan. An all-volunteer force, the SDF's authorized strength is only 259,058—and it is chronically short of personnel. The Ground SDF is currently at 86 percent of authorized strength. There is no conscription law; any attempt to pass one, unless Japan faces a clear and imminent danger, would precipitate a constitutional crisis. A political ceiling of 1 percent of GNP has been placed on defense expenditures. Attempts to spend more face tough sledding even within the LDP and the bureaucracy, to say nothing of the opposition political parties and the public.

"National security" was the justification for Japan's seizure of the Korean peninsula in 1910 and colonial rule until 1945. Talk of a military role there evokes memories of prewar imperialism, the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, and the disastrous Pacific war. The Japanese public is not signing up for a rerun of that misadventure. Not that the SDF would be welcome in Korea, anyway. At the sight of Japanese troops coming to "rescue" a Seoul government, many ROK soldiers would shoot their officers and defect to the "other Koreans." If Japan's "interests" are to be defended, it will have to be by GIs from Duluth and Philadelphia. Hence the determined opposition to U.S. troop withdrawal.

Crying "wolf" on security is a dangerous game. Tokyo cannot dictate President Carter's Korean policy or demand that U.S. troops remain there. But by asserting an inflated "security interest" on the peninsula, Japan is making common cause with those unreconstructed hawks like General Richard G. Stilwell who are trying to discredit Carter's initiative. And Japan is perforce in collusion with Park Chung Hee and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which has tried to subvert the American government and may be counted upon to continue covert operations and to stage "incidents" to prevent withdrawal. If the Carter administration caves in to these pressures—as it already appears to be doing—the best opportunity in three decades to reduce a misguided Asian commitment will be lost.

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THE STRANGE RIDE OF RUDYARD KIPLING. His Life and Works, by Angus Wilson. Viking Press, 370 pp., $17.50.

The raucous Kipling

DONALD DAVIE

AT WHAT POINT DID KIPLING begin to count for so little in the imaginative experience of youth? In my youth (and earlier too, in my childhood—but that's another matter), certainly Kipling counted for a great deal, for good or ill. In England in the late 1930s he counted often enough as a sort of legendary bounder, the man you love to hate. Racist, imperialist, vulgarian, reactionary—to right-thinking liberals such as we supposed ourselves to be, he was a sort of Lucifer figure, the man who had spoken the unspeakable. But whether as hero or villain, he was an inescapable, imaginative presence. Now it seems all that has changed. Even my Asian students cease to be mutinous when I remind them that Nirad C. Chaudhuri has declared *Kim* to be "the finest story about India, in English." When did the change come about? When did Kipling cease to arouse passions, either for or against? I don't know the answer; I only register that the change has occurred.

For some years now, Kipling has been a thoroughly respectable author. And yet the international fame which came to him in astonishingly early youth, which he never lost until his death in 1936, was never "respectable." It was notoriety as much as it was fame; if fame, the fame of the scandalous. And we can see that this was what Kipling sought, deliberately—not at all in his style of life (for no author ever more fiercely preserved the decorum of his privacy), but in the style and substance of his writings. With the admittedly large exception of what Kipling wrote for and about children, what he wanted to do in his work, what he succeeded in doing over and over again, was to set teeth on edge. And so if he's now respectable, it may be that we have emasculated him, drawn his fangs now that he can no longer bare them. In that case, of course, we are falsifying him.

Angus Wilson, though his capacious and painstaking and absorbing book offers itself modestly enough as an interim contribution to "Kipling studies," is nonetheless properly restive about that very concept. Kipling studies—the very expression confers respectability, smoothing down into stately and equable deliberation something which we experience, whenever we go back to the Kipling texts, as on the contrary raw and raucous, excessive, deliberately "tasteless." It would be hard, for example, to think of a phrase that has set more teeth on edge, or raised more blood pressures, than the notorious line from the "Recessional" —"Or lesser breeds without the Law." From 1897 to the present day, that verse has been consistently misread so as to understand by "lesser breeds" black or brown or yellow races as against the white. In fact, "lesser breeds" is meant to point to allegedly inferior *white* races (notably the Germans). All the same, Wilson is quite right to insist that this reading is not much or at all less raucous and tasteless, less "racist," than the other. Both the line and the poem as a whole are meant to be shocking, and they *are* shocking, particularly because the entire composition hangs together very powerfully, consistently alluding in its imagery and rhetoric to the Old Testament and the ideology of ancient Israel. If we read the poem without being shocked by it, we are not in truth reading the poem at all. It is a fine and powerful piece, and we have to square our sense of that with the fact that the sentiments it expresses seem to many thoughtful people to be intolerable.

There are other authors with whom we

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have the same difficulty. D. H. Lawrence is one, as Angus Wilson notes. Another is Ezra Pound. And really Kipling's case is nearer to the American case of Pound. For Lawrence's stridencies were in some measure inevitable, given his origins in a provincial and conspicuously unprivileged sector of English society; whereas

Kipling sought notoriety and to set teeth on edge; if now he has become respectable, we have falsified him.

Kipling like Pound deliberately *chose* stridency as a literary and rhetorical and polemical strategy, in no way compelled to it by being born in any sense an outsider. Angus Wilson's is, as he says, "a literary study," not principally a biography. But it is cast solidly in a biographical framework, and one of the biographical facts that it brings out very strikingly is how far Kipling, through his connections on his mother's side, belonged to a solid and privileged sector of the Victorian bourgeoisie. His being born in India, and his not going to Oxford or Cambridge, should not delude us; as the nephew of Edward Burne-Jones and of the president of the Royal Academy, first cousin of Stanley Baldwin, later prime minister, Kipling had ready access to most respectable inner circles of the English cultural elite. But while never breaking with these family connections, he conspicuously and consistently refused to take advantage of the comfortable "insider" status that they could have afforded him. Similarly Pound deliberately spurned and affronted the cultural establishments, both American and English, that were ready to embrace him, casting himself as maverick and populist—just as Kipling had done 25 years earlier when he chose to speak for Tommy Atkins, the British enlisted man, first in India, then in South Africa, and finally back home in England.

Now that both men are dead, "Pound studies," like "Kipling studies," incorporates the dead maverick into a cultural establishment which he was at pains, while alive, to defy and affront. With the best will in the world, in the interests of compassionate understanding, literary scholars tend to direct attention away from the bodies of writing that are and always were most questionable because most shocking, most deliberately nonconforming; in Kipling's case, away from the work of the 1890s towards the post-1918 stories, where sophisticated subtleties and evasive resonance can make him seem at last a colleague of Henry James.

ANGUS WILSON IS VERY WELL aware of this, and suspicious of it. He thinks the late stories have been overrated; instead he demands renewed attention for *Soldiers Three*, and the poems and stories of the young Kipling which deliberately use journalistic vulgarities as shock tactics. Though he makes it plain that he writes out of a deep sympathy with Kipling both as man and artist, we are equally left in no doubt that he's frequently outraged by his author's sentiments, political, ethical, and even religious. It's because Wilson is impaled on the horns of this dilemma, and doesn't pretend otherwise, that his book comes across as altogether more urgent and engaged than the scholarly studies that he duly draws upon and politely acknowledges. Despite the rather shabby earnestness with which he proceeds (for his style in criticism is homespun and laborious), still we are aware, sentence by sentence, of the Angus Wilson who wrote *The Wrong Set* and *Late Call*; this is one English storyteller interrogating another, not a critic adjudicating and interpreting.

The shared Englishness, moreover, matters as much as the shared literary calling, as Wilson makes clear by sparse, but always tactful and telling allusions to his own childhood in South Africa, his own boyhood and youth in southern England. The common colonial origin is particularly important; for it is the returned colonial—Kipling home from India, Wilson home from South Africa—who experiences the rediscovered homeland with an aching intensity that his homekeeping cousins are disconcerted by. This is what distinguishes the lovely books of Kipling's Edwardian period, his stories of the Sussex he settled in after his abortive and painful residence in Vermont, and *Puck of Pook's Hill*, his evocation of English history in prose and verse, originally composed at this period for his own children. (And there is more to it than that, for it was earlier that he had demanded—not complacently, but in fury at the complacency of the insular English—"What can they know of England, who only England know?")

PUCK OF POOK'S HILL IS NOT the only book of which we have to say that it is written in prose and verse together. A story with a poem at its head, or at its tail, or framed between poems both first and last, is a distinct literary form that Kipling invented and perfected and practiced throughout his life. Kipling doesn't fall between the two stools of prose and verse, but his critics do, because our criticism has not worked out any way of accounting for this hybrid form. Wilson, a novelist, tries to make the stories stand free of the poems, as T. S. Eliot, a poet, tried to consider the poems apart from the stories. I don't know what else either of them could have done, and they don't thereby seriously falsify Kipling's achievement in prose or verse, but until criticism acknowledges this mixed form and finds a way to deal with it, it will remain incapable of seeing where Kipling stands in relation to other novelists and other poets. In that sense, and to that extent, the best critics of Kipling—Wilson in this book, like Eliot in his essay on the poetry in 1941—in the end retire baffled, confessing that Kipling remains inscrutable and unaccountable.

There is nothing shameful in this. In fact it shows critics recovering a proper humility, after a period when, armed with Freudian insights, they thought they had broken Kipling's code and unlocked his secret. The most famous and justly influential of those more confident examinations was an essay by the late Edmund Wilson, "The Kipling that Nobody Read," which bore heavily upon the traumatic experience of Kipling's boyhood beginning when, as a six-year-old, he along with his younger sister was housed with strangers in England, not to be claimed by his parents until his mother returned from India a full five years later. Kipling broke his own rule of austere reticence by telling of these wretched years under thin fictional disguise in the story, "Baa, Baa, Black Sheep," and those who have seen the harrowing television version will understandably believe there is still much to be said for Edmund Wilson's diagnosis. It isn't, however, by any means such an open-and-shut case as many of us thought after we had first considered "The Kipling that Nobody Read." And to speak for myself, I find it impressive when Angus Wilson on his last page, after reviewing this and other Freudian explanations, decides:

I prefer if I must a social-historical descrip-

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tion of long generations of Evangelical belief ending in post-Darwinian doubt. But the mystery of human personality defies all explanations.

If we can agree to rest with a conclusion that is so chastening to our presumption as literary critics, and (let us admit it) so frustrating to our legitimate curiosity about the personality that created *Kim* and *The Jungle Books, Soldiers Three* and *The Just-So Stories* and *Puck of Pook's Hill*, at least we can tell ourselves that we are falling in with the declared wishes of the man who wrote:

If I have given you delight
By aught that I have done,
Let me lie quiet in that night
Which shall be yours anon:

And for the little, little span
The dead are borne in mind,
Seek not to question other than
The books I leave behind.

This is the voice of the decorous elderly Kipling, Horatian in verse as it was Jamesian in prose. The sobriety and dignity are genuine and impressive. But what we and our students need to rediscover is the belligerent, taunting, and accusing Kipling of 20, 30, 40 years before. ❏

HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: The Family Besieged, by Christopher Lasch. Basic Books, 230 pp., $12.95.

In loco parentis

PETER SCHRAG

THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF hand-wringing and teeth-gnashing lately about the plight of the American family. Jimmy Carter wants to save it with tax reform, and Kenneth Keniston, who headed the Carnegie Commission on Children, wants to save it with a sort of consumerism by which the clients of social service hold the purveyors accountable. Their concern, like that of hundreds of other writers, sociologists, and politicians, reflects a growing disenchantment with the bureaucracies and social institutions that, in the past two generations, have taken over many of the family's traditional functions in health, education, and welfare. Those agencies have always claimed that they possessed a therapy to conjure away problems which were the inexorable consequences of industrialization, alienation, and the general condition of modern life; that they were simply picking up the pieces after the breakdown of the family in the face of invincible social forces; and that if they fell short of total success, it was only for lack of money, personnel, and authority. In social service, as in Vietnam, failure only proved that escalation was imperative.

In social service, as in Vietnam, past failures only justified escalation.

It was always nonsense, and in his new book Christopher Lasch, the anatomist of *The Agony of the American Left,* works industriously to prove how pernicious that nonsense is. Far from picking up the pieces, he says, it was the professionals and the experts, outriders of corporate capitalism, who created the problems and the breakdown in the first place. "Historians of the family," he argues in *Haven in a Heartless World,* "have paid too little attention to the way in which public policy, sometimes conceived quite deliberately not as a defense of the family at all but as an invasion of it, contributed to the deterioration of domestic life. The family did not simply evolve in response to social and economic influences; it was deliberately transformed by the intervention of planners and policymakers." What scientific management did to de-skill the worker in the factory, social service did to destroy his confidence in raising his children and in living a self-sufficient family life.

On the surface Lasch's case is simple: The breakdown did not begin in the last few years. Rather, it goes back to the first decades of this century when the professionals—educators, sociologists, doctors, social workers—discovered "preventive medicine" and evolved a theory in which the state became the ultimate parent of the child; when the school came to be regarded not merely as a purveyor of basic skills and knowledge but as a moral and psychological institution "charged with the . . . social training of the child"; and when social workers began to develop their contempt for the competence of families and parents:

> With the rise of the "helping professions" in the first three decades of the twentieth century, society in the guise of a "nurturing mother" invaded the family . . . and took over many of its functions. The diffusion of the new ideology of social welfare had the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy. By persuading the housewife, and finally even her husband as well, to rely on outside technology and the advice of outside experts, the apparatus of mass tuition—the successor to the church in a secularized society—undermined the family's capacity to provide for itself and thereby justified the continuing expansion of health, education and welfare services.

Lasch contends that nothing that's man-made is inevitable, and that when sociologists describe the "necessary" results of "impersonal forces," they are often merely providing rationalizations for invasions of the family and for control over the individual. He then goes on to analyze the consequences of those developments in the rage they produce in the children of permissive parents (whose fantasies of parental discipline remain unmitigated by the exercise of real parental authority), in the replacement of intimacy with "psychic survival" as the goal of domestic life, in the confusion of psychic health with "an absence of inner restraints," in the substitution of "reality" for moral authority as the guideline for personal behavior, and in the subjection of "the citizen's entire existence" to social direction "unmediated by the family or other institutions."

HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS World is an important book, and much of it is elegantly written and elegantly argued. Yet finally it's frustrating—partly because it is important—the work of a man who seems to know more than he understands. Lasch devotes most of his energy to attacks on conventional sociology of the family (which is like shooting fish in a barrel) without providing the empirical data—the hard facts—which, quite correctly, he says the sociologists ignore. As a conse-

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quence it's often hard to know exactly where he's going; to understand how and why and in what way the professionals and the experts took over; to judge whether they were really the agents of corporate capitalism (creating consumers of services as well as of goods) or just its apes and imitators; and to assess to what extent the things they did in fact reflected a small-town fear of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration rather than (as Lasch suggests) the imperious extension of capitalist control. Surely it's possible to argue that it was the professionals and experts who destroyed the small town and the "services" it informally provided—not only in the support it gave the individual and the family in matters of health, morals, and welfare, but in the rituals and order it established. One could argue further that if it had not been for the social service professionals, the skills and the confidence in coping which had existed in the small town could have been transferred to urban, industrial settings.

Lasch, however, doesn't attempt to make the case; his cosmology is composed of just two primary entities, the family itself, and the "heartless world" from which it was once supposedly a haven, and he virtually ignores the community which once enveloped the family—gave *it* shelter in a heartless world—and imposed certain standards in return. It is also at least possible to suggest that the "helping professions" were (and still are) the embodiment of traditional WASP standards, were (and are) agents sent by a white, Protestant society to teach manners and morals to the slobs just off the boat—later to blacks and Chicanos—and that they came to be viewed as usurpers only when they turned around and began to practice on the people who had originally hired them. In passing, Lasch mentions the fear of the sociologists and politicians of the 1920s that good American families weren't producing enough good American children. But he never suggests that that fear was itself part of a pervasive terror about race degeneration, mongrelization, and what was sometimes seen as the contamination of American society by the proliferating criminalistic, imbecile, lunatic offspring of millions of immigrant Greeks, Poles, Russians, and Italians. The techniques of factory efficiency became models for all sorts of social planners and theorists in the first decades of the twentieth century, but the vision they fostered usually came straight from a Currier and Ives image of the small town of the nineteenth century.

UNFORTUNATELY LASCH doesn't understand that there's a difference between the "isolation" of the traditional family—which was subjected to the significant intrusion of the state and its experts—and the "isolation" of the contemporary middle-class suburban mother. Thus he misreads Philip Slater's criticism of "the idea of imprisoning each woman alone in a small, self-contained, and architecturally isolating dwelling" as a call to diminish "the intensity of the bond between parent and child." (To say "mother" or "woman" is not the same as saying "parent," and in that confusion lies a great deal that would have made Lasch's case more persuasive.) Slater, in *The Pursuit of Loneliness,* writes that "one has only to see a village community in which women work and socialize in groups with children playing nearby, also in groups, supervised by the older ones, or by some of the mothers on a haphazardly shared basis, to realize what is awkward about the domestic role in America." It is the very absence of such arrangements that creates the "isolation" which, in turn, opens the door to the "experts" and the attendant professionalization of child rearing and other social services. It is the presence of other adults around the home—friends, neighbors, fellow workers—and the existence, wherever possible, of real work and real interests rooted in the world outside that create the competence and confidence that he says—correctly—the contemporary family so badly lacks. Yet, finally, it's hard to know where Lasch stands on this issue. He seems to look upon Slater's ideal of community as the substitution of a "diffuse, easygoing, nondemanding warmth for the passion that fastens neurotically on a single individual," yet in another place Lasch himself seems to flirt with the idea. Writing in the *New York Review of Books* recently, he said:

> In order to break the existing pattern of dependence and stop the erosion of competence, citizens must take the solution of their problems—the deterioration of child care, for example—into their own hands. They must create their own agencies of collective self-help, their own "communities of competence." This sounds utopian, but American society contains many traditions of localism, self-help, and community action, not yet defunct by any means, on which to base such a politics of decentralization.

If that "utopian" vision is not identical to Slater's image of the women in the marketplace, it surely resembles a credible substitute. ❑

CRISIS ON THE LEFT: Cold War Politics and American Liberals, 1947–1954, by Mary Sperling McAuliffe. University of Massachusetts Press, 204 pp., $12.50.

Liberal paralysis

RONALD RADOSH

IN 1948 OLIN DOWNES, THE cultural critic of the *New York Times,* predicted that "when the record is written, it will not be flattering to the 'liberal' intellectuals of America." According to Downes, the liberals had bought the Cold War and its implications, deciding that "it was safer to break the faith which they had long and politely professed." Now, some 30 years later, young scholars are beginning to assess the record of those years, and the conclusions they are reaching are strikingly similar to Downes's contemporary observation.

Mary S. McAuliffe begins *Crisis on the Left* by discussing the breakup of the wartime Popular Front left after World War II. The new liberalism—more in tune with the Cold War—was symbolized by Americans for Democratic Action, founded in 1947. The leaders of ADA both accepted the Truman administration's hard-line foreign policy, and waged an attack on the critics of that policy on the American left. Thus ADA distinguished itself by taking the lead in branding Henry Wallace's 1948 third party campaign as a totally Communist effort. Abandoning traditional liberal tenets, the new Cold War liberals espoused a doctrine of "realism." Abroad, McAuliffe writes, their realist doctrine "stressed readiness for conflict," while at home they favored a new consensus politics intended to quiet conflict. "Real-

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Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism,
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ism in foreign policy decried efforts to end armed conflict as dangerously illusionary, while consensus in domestic politics sought the end of ideology and of radical threats to the status quo."

McAuliffe makes her major contribution by painting a sorry and often devastating portrait: Having accepted Cold War politics as a necessity, political and intellectual liberalism suffered a total paralysis during the period covered by her book. Once the new liberals had established the necessity of excluding Communists and Popular Front leftists (i.e., fellow travelers) from the realm of admissible discourse and debate, it was easy for them to go on to support governmental limits on the free marketplace of ideas. They did it with little hesitation and without any regret.

Their strategy was simply to try to prove to the most extreme anti-Communists that they could go them one better. In response to both the Mundt-Nixon Bill and conservative Democrat Pat McCarran's Internal Security Act, congressional Democratic liberals offered their own substitute measure—a preventive detention bill that would allow the attorney general to order the rounding up of suspected subversives during a national emergency. The move backfired. The conservatives simply added that provision to their own bill. With liberal support, the McCarran Act became law in 1950.



TOM WILSON

ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED better from liberals in the American Civil Liberties Union, but McAuliffe shows that the ACLU too "attempted to temper liberalism with Cold War 'realism.'" Its national officers agreed on the need to limit the spectrum of permissible public debate; anyone to the left of that spectrum was to be *persona non grata*. Professor McAuliffe's book was written before the recent revelation that one member of the ACLU's Washington office reported to J. Edgar Hoover on a regular basis during the 1950s and that other National Board members requested information from Hoover on members of local ACLU affiliates they suspected might be pro-Communist. But her chapter prepares readers for this development and puts it into proper context.

The ACLU, we learn, officially proclaimed Communism to be a conspiracy rather than a political movement. Its officers, therefore, proved more than reluctant to defend the rights of Communists, and they sought to evade acting in cases where civil liberties and the Communist issue intersected. The ACLU even allowed its own major campaign against blacklisting in the entertainment industry "to slip into a defensive, embarrassed silence," because some board members doubted the existence of a blacklist and because they thought that Communism rather than McCarthyism was the only real danger in America. These board members used their time and energy to wage a vendetta against local affiliates that were less anti-Communist than the ACLU's National Board. When Corliss Lamont (the most left-wing member of that board) refused to answer questions before the McCarthy committee by citing the First Amendment, the ACLU delayed coming to his aid. Indeed, some board members—including Norman Thomas and Max Ernst—then actively sought Lamont's removal from the board.

But it was in the intellectual community that the real *trahison des clercs* took place. Others, especially Christopher Lasch, have explored the politics and ideology of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, but McAuliffe is the first historian to offer a complete picture of the ACCF's internal debates and conflicts on the basis of the papers and Executive Committee minutes of the organization.

The ACCF worked hard to fight the remnants of Popular Front leftism and to rally American intellectuals to the fight against Communism. A united front of right-wingers and anti-Communist liberals and socialists, the ACCF tried to interfere with the efforts of intellectuals who defended the civil liberties of Communists, particularly the intellectuals supporting Corliss Lamont's new Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. It even labeled the ECLC—which was not even on the attorney general's list—a Communist front. Like their avowed Communist enemies, the ACCF leaders argued that culture should serve the interests of politics. It did not occur to them, evidently, that the argument bore a curious similarity to the Zhadanov view of culture as a weapon.

The cooperation between former radicals turned right-wingers and anti-Communist liberals proved to be short-lived. Liberal centrists began to see the Red hunt as a threat to cultural freedom, while right-wingers in the ACCF like Max Eastman defended McCarthy and argued that the body should enlist in the senator's crusade.

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Reading this book, one has little awareness that some on the left attacked both Stalinism and Cold War policies at home and abroad.

Yet, despite their conflicts, the ACCF liberals were "willing to accept right-wing fanaticism from former radicals." Thus Daniel Bell did not want the centrists to ask James Burnham to resign simply because Burnham had endorsed a book whose author argued that prominent atomic scientists were engaged in treasonous activity on behalf of Russia. Bell was for toleration, McAuliffe comments, "so long as opinion was not leftist." And when they finally tried to court liberal opinion by showing they were against McCarthy—after 1954—the result was James Rorty and Moshe Dector's *McCarthy and the Communists,* a study, McAuliffe notes, which "proposed that McCarthy's chief danger was in giving less flamboyant anti-Communists a black eye."

THE POLITICIANS WERE NOT much better. McAuliffe shows how the anti-Communist liberals had so accepted the assumptions of the Red Scare, that while they thought they were opposing McCarthyism, they were actually helping to prolong it. Their actions revealed how deeply McCarthyite attitudes "had penetrated American society . . . affecting even those who attempted to fight the Red Scare and McCarthy himself." McAuliffe is referring, of course, to Hubert Humphrey's introduction of the Communist Control Act of 1954, which called for the outlawing of the Communist Party.

Why did the Democratic liberals propose such a patently illiberal and possibly unconstitutional measure? Humphrey's rationale was one of expedience: It was a way, through legislation, to protect the anti-Communist left, so that liberals could no longer be falsely accused of being Communists. Under the proposed law, such smears would be grounds for libel.

Once again, Humphrey found himself outmaneuvered by the conservative Democrat, McCarran. With his amendments, the act passed with the penalty provisions removed. The final version simply deprived the Communist Party of the rights of a legal entity. Yet the liberal Democrats still supported the act, for it allowed them to save their careers by establishing their own tough anti-Communist credentials. But to argue, as they did, that the act was a civil libertarian measure because it harmed only the *real* Communists, McAuliffe comments, "indicates a failure to comprehend the basic dangers of the Red Scare—the threat to the freedom of speech and assembly of an unpopular minority." Whatever little the liberals did to bring McCarthy down, she concludes, was "more than counterbalanced by their ardent support for the Communist Control Act." And so, she ends her volume, the liberalism of the new Vital Center was found wanting, "weak and ineffective," a failure both for the left and for the entire nation.

MCAULIFFE HAS MADE her points by wielding a deft scalpel. Yet, if there is a problem with her book, it is the implicit assumption that given the polarization of the Cold War epoch, one had to be an advocate either of the Popular Front left or of the new Cold War liberalism. For those on the left, it seems, there was no other choice. Reading her book, one has little awareness that there were those on the left who saw Stalinism for what it was, but who neither supported Cold War foreign policy nor joined the crusade to strip Communists of their rights.

One has but to refer to the first year of *Dissent* (1954) to find an anti-Stalinist like Irving Howe arguing that ADA's liberalism was bankrupt, that their convention passed "resounding general statements in behalf of civil liberties, with little qualifying clauses that emasculated them." One would also find in those pages Michael Harrington's sharp attack on the ACCF, so reminiscent of McAuliffe's own, in which the young socialist argued that the ACCF was "less an organization devoted to the defense of cultural freedom than an agency propagandizing the American party line." And like McAuliffe, sociologist Dennis Wrong commented that Rorty and Dector "might argue that *they* are deeply disturbed by McCarthy's inroads on civil liberties, but their intended audience is less likely to be moved by the protests of civil libertarians than by demonstrations of McCarthy's ineffectiveness as a Communist-hunter." Thus, not all the anti-Stalinist intellectuals went the way of McAuliffe's liberals; some never broke the faith they had long professed. The Popular Front left, it is clear, was not the only position from which one could have experienced the 1950s. ❏

THE SEX RADICALS: Free Love in High Victorian America, by Hal D. Sears. Regents Press of Kansas, 342 pp., $15.00.

Love against the state

GEORGE WOODCOCK

THE AMERICAN RADICALS of the middle and late nineteenth century, celebrated and even notorious as they were in their time, receded for many years into obscurity. This was part of the general twilight that enveloped most varieties of libertarian thought during the increasingly totalitarian decades after the Great War and the Russian Revolution. In recent years, however, this American tradition has received a growing degree of attention, especially in general works like James J. Martin's *Men Against the State* (1957) and William O. Reichert's recent and comprehensive *Partisans of Freedom* (1976), and now in works covering more particular aspects of the nineteenth century struggle for broader freedoms. Of these, Hal D.

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Sears's *The Sex Radicals: Free Love in High Victorian America* is a notable and valuable example.

The subtitle of *The Sex Radicals* gives one perhaps too narrow an impression of the field into which Sears has been led by this study of nineteenth century advocates of sexual freedom. For the writers and publicists who figure in the center of the stage—Moses Harman and Ezra Heywood, Edwin Walker and Lillian Harman, Dr. E. B. Foote and Elmina Slenker, Lois Waisbrooker and Lillie White—were involved in a great deal more than the advocacy of free love in the narrower sense of sexual unions unsanctioned by the state. They were inevitably active in sex education of all kinds and in the spreading of information about the somewhat primitive methods of contraception that existed a century ago. Hence, long before the advent of Emma Goldman, they became involved with Anthony Comstock, the notorious Pharisee, in the great battle for freedom of speech and writing on sexual matters. (It was Comstock who had sought to use the U.S. Post Office as a massive machine of censorship, and who had harried at least one sex reformer, Ida C. Craddock, to the point of suicide.) For the most part, the sex radicals were people whose purity of motive gave them great courage. They operated often in the puritanical world of rural America—a surprising number of them came from the small towns of Kansas—undergoing repeated trials and terms of imprisonment at a time when the American penal system was in most places a great deal harsher than it is anywhere today. Moses Harman, at the age of 75, breaking stones eight-and-a-half hours a day outdoors in the Illinois winter, personifies the kind of martyrdom many of these rebels endured.

AS IT CAME TO THE SURFACE in the writings of Stephen Pearl Andrews and others during the 1840s, the free love movement was intertwined with other movements of native American radicalism. The link with individualist anarchism was a natural one, and so was that with the struggle for women's rights, since one of the qualities that distinguished free love unions from libertinism was that these unions released women from one form of Victorian slavery by making sexual intercourse a matter of consent between equal beings. (By no means all feminists, however, accepted the arguments for free love, and the wider women's rights movement tended to concentrate on gaining power through the vote rather than on liberation through abolishing the institution of marriage as a legal entity.) Somewhat less to be expected was the frequent alliance between free love advocates and spiritualists.

The great variety of approaches among the sex radicals, who themselves were passionate individualists, makes any unified study rather difficult, and Sears has done well to take as a central thread the history of Moses Harman's famous magazine, *Lucifer: The Light Bearer,* published for many years from the little Kansas town of Valley Falls. *Lucifer* metamorphosed in 1883 from the *Kansas Liberal* and continued until Harman's death in 1910, surviving the many periods when Harman was in prison and the magazine was temporarily put out by his faithful associates in the movement. Perhaps *Lucifer*'s most important characteristic was its breadth of approach, for Harman ran it as an open forum, in which he dared to publish almost anything that bore on sex reform and other related subjects. As a consequence, though often poorly edited, it was the one periodical in which almost all the leading sex radicals of the time appeared, and in which almost all the varieties of free love doctrine were promulgated, from Alphaism, which demanded an almost monastic chastity, with intercourse only for propagation, to Dianaism, which allowed intercourse for pleasure but without male climax, and finally to Varietism, which allowed sex for pleasure with a number of partners.

They fought for the rights of women, to release them from one form of slavery by making sex a matter of free consent.

At times the nineteenth century sexual reformers astonish one with their eccentricity. There is Elmina (originally Elizabeth) Slenker getting a husband through advertisements in *The Water-Cure Journal.* There is James Culverwell organizing his abortive Army of Rescue in the Kansas countryside to liberate the imprisoned Chicago anarchists in the 1880s. There is Dr. E. B. Foote and his alarming contraceptive device, the Electro-Magnetic Preventive Machine, and his son, another E. B. Foote, with an alliterative mania resulting in such titles as *The Radical Remedy in Social Science: or Borning Better Babies through Regulating Reproduction by Controlling Conception.* There is Ezra Heywood with his gallantly pathetic belief that if only we called things by their proper names and said *fuck* when we meant it, ignorance would no longer reign.

For all their unconscious comedy, these people were passionately earnest and always ready to sacrifice themselves. To help fellow radicals in trouble, even the prosperous Drs. Foote gave away much of the money they made in their mail order practice.

ONE CANNOT RELATE SUCH men and women too closely to the sex rebels of our own day. As Sears remarks, "Each generation, it seems, has to fight the struggle for sexual freedom all over again," and, one might add, in its own way.

To begin, the nineteenth century sex radicals were, politically at least, attached to an earlier, more agrarian, less organized America than the one that emerged with industrialization and state organization, and much of their battle was against the increasing intrusiveness of the law, in those puritanical days directed largely toward preserving conventional morality. Nowadays, the intrusiveness of the law has not decreased, but it has moved in other directions, so that the contemporary sexual revolution has involved far less persecution than was endured by Harman, Heywood, and their associates.

Then there is the fact that, as Sears also remarks, "The pervasive Victorian fear of sex determined in large part the nature of Victorian sex radicalism." The sex radicals were not hedonists; indeed, their respect for chastity, their emphasis on abstention (which stemmed at least partly from the inadequacy of early contraceptives and the prevalent dread of venereal disease) made them apostles of self-control rather than promiscuity. Their air of burning, unquestioning righteousness, which they shared with their archenemy Comstock, creates unease in a modern mind. Like all rebels, they remained children of their time in the very act of leaping beyond it. ❑

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FILM

***COMING HOME*, directed by Hal Ashby**

***THE BOYS IN COMPANY C*, directed by Sidney Furie**

Army fatigue

STEPHEN HARVEY

WHEN OUR MISADVENTURES in Southeast Asia were at their height, Hollywood busied itself by churning out the celluloid equivalent of nonstop R and R—the conventional wisdom in the trade being that the whole subject of Vietnam was too volatile (read "uncommercial") to be molded into palatable movie fare. It's true that war lovers were briefly titillated by John Wayne's *The Green Berets*, but this was deemed rather bad PR for the industry at a time when the youth market was the Holy Grail. Hence it was probably the only commercially successful movie of the sixties to spawn no recognizable successors. Meanwhile, doves were courted with between-the-frames genocidal parables linking imperialism in the 1960s with the Manifest Destiny of the 1870s, in movies like *Little Big Man* and *Soldier Blue*. Now that the war has receded into a distant if disconcerting memory, this year the moviemakers have broken their vow of silence with a vengeance, re-creating the horrors of the battlefield in Sidney Furie's *The Boys in Company C* and the accompanying malaise at home in Hal Ashby's *Coming Home*, with such films as *The Dog Soldiers* and *Apocalypse Now* still to come.

Some cynics have scoffed at the belated arrival of all these projects, coming as they do at a time when they are unlikely to offend anyone. Yet, in the case of *Coming Home*, this tardiness has turned out to be an outright advantage.

STEPHEN HARVEY, INQUIRY's film reviewer, is coordinator of the film study program, Museum of Modern Art, New York City.

It's easy to imagine what this film might have been like had it been made in the polarized era that inspired it—something replete with shrill archetypes spouting impassioned rhetoric, while encased in the flashy, fragmented techniques so chic five to ten years ago. Instead, the perspective of time has granted *Coming Home* a kind of rueful serenity that illuminates it practically throughout. The political underpinnings are always implicit, but since the ideology of everyone concerned with the movie has long since prevailed, there's no need to rack up points in the moral fervor department anymore. When *Coming Home* is at its best (which is very good indeed), the ideas it seeks to express spring naturally from the development of the characters—ordinary people jolted by experience into dealing with the grim consequences of the war.

The year 1968 seems to hold a particular fascination for Hal Ashby; both this film and his *Shampoo* take place in that year. Yet while *Shampoo* focuses on people whose wealth insulated them from the chaos outside, the protagonists of *Coming Home* come from that majority of Americans who had no such refuge; Vietnam is the unseen catalyst in all their lives. Straight-arrow Captain Hyde (Bruce Dern) jogs blithely around the Marine base in preparation for the big push overseas, while his model wife, an ex-cheerleader named Sally (Jane Fonda), lovingly packs his duds; and self-pitying paraplegic Vietnam vet Luke Martin (Jon Voight) careens down the overcrowded hallways of the local VA hospital on his table on wheels. During Dern's tour of duty, Fonda turns to volunteer work at the hospital to while away her time, finding an unexpected kindred spirit in Voight. As their friendship deepens, he progresses to a wheelchair, antiwar activism, and a new-found maturity; she sheds her shellacked bouffant for natural frizz and discovers she can think and act on her own. But Dern's whole identity is based on conventionally rigid notions of wife, home, and patriotism; already shaken by combat, he is completely unhinged by his homecoming.

As long as *Coming Home* concentrates on the burgeoning romance between Voight and Fonda, the movie remains on firm emotional ground. Their scenes together are beautifully underwritten and directed with unobtrusive intimacy, culminating in the most genuinely erotic and tender love scene to appear in an American movie in a long time. Yet it's really the mutual generosity of Voight and Fonda as actors that brings such poignancy to the roles assigned to them. They are both much too disciplined and assured to indulge in the kind of anything-you-can-say-I-can-say-louder tug-of-war which compounded the phoniness of an alleged romance like *The Goodbye Girl*. The way in which they quietly defer to each other as performers effortlessly conveys the affection that exists between Luke and Sally as characters.

It's really the mutual generosity of Voight and Fonda as actors that brings such poignancy to the roles given them.

ASHBY HAS ALWAYS DISplayed unusual skill with actors, so it shouldn't be that surprising that this movie finds Fonda in better form than at any time since *Klute*, or that Voight transcends everything he's done thus far in his film career. Despite her great personal commitment to this project, Fonda isn't quite as ideally cast as she might seem at first glance; she's perhaps a touch too old for the part, and one's awareness of Fonda the Public Persona intrudes a note of unwonted irony into the polyester toy spouse she impersonates during the film's early scenes. Yet her refusal to patronize this character is apparent right from the beginning, and although she's certainly done more virtuoso work in the past, she's never seemed so at ease on screen before—here she is a pleasure to witness, after all the pinched, self-conscious tics she applied to the Lillian Hellman role in *Julia*. As for Voight, it's ironic that confined to a wheelchair he exudes so much more sheer physical

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presence on screen than he ever did while playing all those disillusioned naifs, striding through the wicked world of grown-ups. It's as though, after years of vanilla-flavored performances, he's suddenly come of age before the cameras. With his sinewy forcefulness, Voight is able to offset the sanctity that clings to this character from time to time, and the simplicity and directness of his approach give conviction to everything he does in the film.

The goodwill generated by Voight and Fonda, and the understated realism of the hospital scenes, go a long way toward compensating for some fairly major lapses. Not the least of these is the nonstop medley of Blasts from the Past which pulsate at random over the soundtrack in a manner that is rather more obtrusive than evocative. A catatonic teen-aged veteran (adequately played by Robert Carradine, youngest of the clan) is introduced and then peremptorily dispatched, for no discernible reason other than to wrench a little extra pathos out of the material.

Most problematic of all is the one-dimensional cipher that stands in where Bruce Dern's character ought to be. Heaven knows that bug-eyed, trembly-chinned Dern has had practice enough playing roles like this before, and he tips his manic hand far too early along. Yet since the part as written is little more than a walking plot device, and unsympathetically limned at that, he can hardly be blamed. Ashby makes a rather feeble analogy between the Marine captain's politics and his sexual shortcomings—a cheap shot that reveals nothing except an unwillingness to take this character very seriously. (Pity the poor movie reactionary—in Italian movies he's forced to sodomize dewy-eyed innocents, while in America he can barely grasp the intricacies of the missionary position.)

As the movie winds down, Luke and Sally aren't the only ones who are troubled by Hyde's impending return—the people behind the camera haven't the remotest notion of what to do with him either. Clearly he can't be permitted to interfere with the love story—that would run contrary to all the expectations the movie carefully nurtures from their first meeting. So in obvious desperation, they force the captain to march headlong into the sea, à la Norman Maine in *A Star Is Born.* In sixties parlance, it's a cop-out, pure and simple. Yet even this can't eradicate the warmth and intelligence of all that preceded it.

THE BOYS IN COMPANY C is, if anything, even more ambitious, detailing the physical and psychological decimation of a Marine company from basic training through final body count. This movie, however, is an object lesson in fumbled good intentions—it's just *The Green Berets* in ideological reverse, scarcely less simple-minded and just as luridly propagandistic. For all I know every outrage depicted in this film may be grounded in absolute, documented truth, but Sidney Furie's apparently boundless instinct for the banal makes it all seem about as fresh and genuine as, say, *Gable and Lombard,* another of his misbegotten projects. The push-button raunch and sentimentality of the script (co-written by Furie) borrows indiscriminately from recent films (a climactic sports match out of *M*A*S*H,* prophetically gloomy end-titles à la *American Graffiti*), and old olive-drab epics dating back at least as far as *Guadalcanal Diary,* then tosses in a few updated variations—lots of cussing and battleworn cynicism, a no-nonsense young black as hero in place of the outmoded WASP icon—without managing for a moment to camouflage how stale it all is. In true Jack L. Warner fashion, the platoon is a model of stereotypic symmetry—the aforementioned street-smart ghetto graduate, the well-scrubbed all-American jock, the benign hippie, the sensitive literary type who keeps a journal, and of course the randy, loud-mouthed Italian stallion (let's hear it for Brooklyn!). With the exception of the black platoon leader, whose muddled motivations shift practically from one shot to the next, you could sketch their nuances of character on the backs of their dogtags, and have room to spare. The treatment of the native populace is, if anything, even more obvious—the displaced peasants are invariably sweet and simple and silent, while the South Vietnamese brass outdo Philip Ahn in sheer Oriental cunning and malice.

The young and largely unknown cast struggles mightily to make something worthwhile out of all this, but they're as doomed as the besieged GIs they were drafted to represent. Furie knows enough to keep things moving at a swift pace, but energy has never been a substitute for basic competence—the bilious color and resolutely flat and uninvolving *mise en scène* match his flair for characterization. It may well be true that he had the sincerest motives in the world for making this movie, but the end result smells like the worst kind of exploitation. ❧

OUT AND AROUND

Close Encounters of the Third Kind—If you're one of the few hardy souls who've been put off by the hype and the endless lines at the box office, now's the time to go ahead and see it. As anyone who succumbed to *Jaws* already knows, nobody else in the business manipulates sound, images, and the audience with the well-calibrated skill of Steven Spielberg. This movie is prestidigitation of the most dazzling order, but anyone who tells you it's a "profound religious experience" is confusing Om with Oz.

The One and Only—Carl Reiner perpetrated this saga of a brazen showoff who finds fame as an exhibition wrestler in the early years of video, and it's an alarming mixture of equal parts goo and grungy bad taste. The endless antics of the hero are supposed to be disarmingly outrageous, but someone should tell Reiner, screenwriter Steve Gordon, and star Henry Winkler that charm and self-love are two entirely different things.

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LETTERS

Letters to the editor should be addressed to INQUIRY Magazine, 1700 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, California 94111. The editors reserve the right to edit letters for length when necessary.

Funds for Paraguay

AFTER READING RICHARD Arens's impressive and informative article, "Death Camps in Paraguay" [*INQUIRY*, Jan. 2, 1978], I sat down to write a letter to my congressman and discovered that I needed additional information in order to write an effective letter. What is the American involvement in Paraguay? How much aid does that government receive from the United States?

JAMES R. ALMBLAD
Portland, Oreg.

Since 1954, when General Alfredo Stroessner took control, the U.S. government has supplied Paraguay with a total of $160 million in economic and military aid. The State Department estimates aid figures for the current fiscal year at $12.7 million economic and $1.1 million military. As of the coming year, U.S. military aid has been phased out, and Brazil has taken over training the Paraguayan military forces.

In addition to direct aid, the United States funds Paraguay through a number of intermediary agencies. In 1977, the Export-Import Bank of the United States provided Paraguay with $7.4 million in loans and guarantees; the Inter-American Development Bank provided $13.8 million; and the World Bank approved $40 million in loans to Stroessner's regime. –EDITORS

Inconsistent watchdog

JONATHAN MARSHALL'S ARTICLE on "Britain's Attack on Civil Liberties" [*INQUIRY*, Jan. 23, 1978] is disfigured by too many mistakes and misunderstandings to pass without comment.

The most important misunderstanding is the assumption that the current official and unofficial attack on civil liberties is something new, when it is part of the battle between the establishment and various dissenting forces which has been running for several centuries. The British "tradition" of "tolerance and liberal spirit" is only a pragmatic recognition of the balance of forces at any given time, and the cases of the past decade are much the same as cases during any previous decade. The most important mistake is the assumption that the National Council for Civil Liberties is "Britain's most vigilant civil liberties watchdog," when it was a Marxist (Stalinist) front during the 1930s and 1940s, and after a libertarian phase has again become a Marxist (Trotskyist) front during the 1970s. Its true position may be seen from its reluctance to campaign for the victims of intolerance by trade unions rather than of "intrusion by the government and industry," for the right not to strike rather than the right to strike, for free speech for right-wing rather than left-wing dissenters, for white rather than black racists. More consistent watchdogs are the Defence of Literature and the Arts Society, and the Writers and Scholars International (publishers of *Index on Censorship)*; and warning barks may also be heard from the anarchist and humanist organizations.

When Marshall criticizes "the government's system of immigration control," which is indeed open to serious objection, he leaves out the important point that Britain still has one of the most liberal immigration policies in the world. When he claims that "the biggest setbacks of the last year have involved press freedom" and concentrates on recent cases of persecution under the laws covering security and blasphemy, he leaves out the important point that some of the biggest advances of recent years have been in these areas, where the press has gone further than ever before in deliberate defiance of such laws. In particular, both the Agee-Hosenball and Aubrey-Berry-Campbell cases involve articles and the *Gay News* case involves a poem which could never have appeared openly before the 1970s.

As Marshall himself says, investigative journalism is "a relatively uncommon disease in Britain," and previous attempts to spread it to government security have involved either imprisonment or clandestinity (as when the "Spies for Peace" in 1963 circulated details of the emergency government system in a pseudonymous pamphlet), but this kind of material is now commonplace in the left-wing press. Similarly, material breaking religious taboos is now commonplace, even in religious papers, and it was Jens Jørgen Thorsen's much-publicized attempt to enter Britain to make a film about the sex life of Jesus which seems to have prompted the *Gay News* case.

The "best hope" of preserving our freedoms in Britain is not "public campaigns by vigilant groups like the National Council for Civil Liberties," as Marshall thinks, but direct action to exercise the freedoms our ancestors extracted in the same way from governments of both left and right.

NICOLAS WALTER
London, England

Guns and pot

BELATED KUDOS TO DON B. Kates, Jr. [*INQUIRY*, Dec. 5, 1977] for his vivisection of the doctrinaire "liberal" pose on guns—one which is every iota as police-statist as the right wing's rigidity on human behavior.

Of course, what Kates really did was clearly state a left-libertarian view on firearms ownership.

In my 10 years of staff employment with the National Rifle Association, and especially the last five years as Western public affairs representative, one of my great burdens was internal—convincing the Sun City/Old Guard hierarchs in NRA that you cannot with integrity urge autos-da-fé for pot smokers while simultaneously insisting on unfettered gun ownership. So I can attest, in tune with Kates's theme, that the pro-gun fossilhood is just as off balance on human liberty as the spastic liberals Kates assails.

BILL DAVIDSON
Mandeville, La.

BILL DAVIDSON is the author of To Keep & Bear Arms.

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